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INTRODUCTION
A common view of banks and other financial institutions is
that they function primarily as intermediaries, managing flows
of scarce funds from those who have accumulated them to
those who have need of them and are ready to pay for their use.
This view of finance is routinely stated in treatises,1 textbooks,2
1
See, e.g., LUDWIG VON MISES, THE THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT 262 (H. E.
Batson trans., Yale Univ. Press 1953) (1912) (“Banking is negotiation between
granters of credit and grantees of credit.”).
2
See, e.g., ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 22–23 (2000) (modeling
financial flows as transfers from “surplus units” to “deficit units,” such as “households” and “firms”); KENT MATTHEWS & JOHN THOMPSON, THE ECONOMICS OF BANKING
33 (2005) (“[F]inancial intermediation is a process which involves surplus units
depositing funds with financial institutions who in turn lend to deficit units.”);
BARBARA CASU ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO BANKING 18 (2006) (Banks and “other financial intermediaries . . . channel[ ] funds from units in surplus to units in deficit.”);
STEPHEN G. CECCHETTI & KERMIT SCHOENHOLTZ, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 39 (3d ed. 2008) (“[A]n institution like a bank stands between the lender and
the borrower, borrowing from the lender and then providing the funds to the
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learned journals,3 and the popular media.4 It also lurks beneath the surface of familiar references to “loanable funds,”
“skittish capital,” “public crowd-out of private investment,” and
the like.5
An unspoken assumption behind the orthodox picture of
finance is that a certain defined quantum of unavoidably
scarce finance capital first accumulates in private hands, after
which financial intermediaries facilitate flows of the privatelyowned funds toward other private (and some public) actors.
State instrumentalities are assumed to perform mainly secondary functions, regulating and otherwise supporting the operation of the essentially private financial marketplace from the
outside. When public instrumentalities occasionally act inside
the financial system, the orthodox view treats them as simply
another category of market actor, functionally indistinguishborrower.”); RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 37
(5th ed. 2013) (describing the “traditional banking function of matching checking
account deposits against . . . commercial loans”); id. at 39 (explainiing that
banks, as financial intermediaries, “take money from investors, pool it, and invest
the pooled money in other enterprises”).
3
See, e.g., John G. Gurley & Edward S. Shaw, Financial Aspects of Economic
Development, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 515 (1955) (elaborating “the role of financial
institutions or intermediaries in transmitting loanable funds between spending
units”); John G. Gurley & Edward S. Shaw, Financial Intermediaries and the
Savings-Investment Process, 11 J. FIN. 257 (1956) (describing financial institutions as intermediaries that transfer funds between parties); James Tobin, Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money,” Cowles Foundation Paper 205 (1963)
(same); C. W. Sealey, Jr. & James T. Lindley, Inputs, Outputs, and a Theory of
Production and Cost at Depository Financial Institutions, 32 J. FIN. 1251, 1252
(1977) (“The transformation process for a financial firm involves the borrowing of
funds from surplus spending units and lending those funds to deficit spending
units, i.e. financial intermediation.”); Ernst Baltensperger, Alternative Approaches
to the Theory of the Banking Firm, 6 J. MONETARY ECON. 1, 1 (1980) (“The main
economic functions of financial firms are those of consolidating and transforming
risks on the one hand, and of serving as dealers or ‘brokers’ in the credit markets
. . . on the other hand.”).
4
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Rage of the Bankers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
2015, at A21 (“[B]anks make their profits by taking in deposits and lending the
funds out at a higher rate of interest.”).
5
See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., Bond Investors are Skittish Over Emerging
Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2014, at B1 (discussing panic sales and “bond
frenz[ies]” in connection with emerging markets); Tom Lydon, Skittish Investors
Turn to Safe-Haven Government Bonds, ETFs, ETF TRENDS (Oct. 15, 2014) (discussing “safe-haven” investors in U.S. government debt); Donald P. Morgan &
Kevin J. Stiroh, Bond Market Discipline of Banks: Is the Market Tough Enough?,
FRBNY Staff Reports (Dec. 20, 1999) (discussing the putatively “disciplining” role
of bond markets); Christopher J. Mailander, Tempering a Chill on Skittish Capital
Markets: Illiquid Investments in the Wake of Global Volatility, 13 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 379 (1997) (attributing global capital market volatility to investor “skittishness”); Olivier Blanchard, Crowding Out, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 327 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the idea that public investment “crowds out”
private investment).
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able from the private parties with whom they compete for access to inherently scarce private capital.
This understanding of finance is a pernicious and costly
myth.
It is pernicious and costly because its fundamental premise that capital is inherently scarce and privately provided
functions as a would-be “objective” justification for policy
choices that place control over the allocation of resources—a
matter of obvious public significance—exclusively in private
hands.6 Private misallocation of capital and needlessly painful
public austerity measures, often adopted in response to harms
brought by such misallocation, are easier justified as putatively
unavoidable costs that society must bear in return for a viable
market economy.7
The intermediated-scarce-private-capital orthodoxy is a
myth, in turn, because it profoundly misrepresents the reality
of modern financial systems. Financial institutions and markets do intermediate, but, as we will demonstrate, that is not
what they are mainly about.8 Nor is capital scarce in any sense
recognizable under current conditions of chronic credit over-

6
Even self-professed liberal policymakers implicitly commit to this pattern
when they treat capital as a privately-provided scarce resource. See David J.
Lynch & Cordell Eddings, Obama Says Real Boss in Default Showdown Means
Bonds Call Shots, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2013) (“President Barack Obama knows
who is the boss: the bond market.”); James Surowiecki, Bonds and Domination,
N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 1, 1999) (citing President Clinton’s incredulous question, “You
mean to tell me that the success of the [economic] program and my re-election
hinges on the Federal Reserve and a bunch of fucking bond traders?”).
7
See, e.g., EUGEN V. BÖHM-BAWERK, CAPITAL & INTEREST (1884), a founding
work of the Austrian School of economics. A helpful corrective is JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Redvers Opie trans., Harv. U.
Press 1934) (1912) (discussing the role that endogenous credit-generation by
banks plays in the economic development process).
8
On one understanding of “intermediation,” it is trivially true that banks
and other financial institutions intermediate, in the most readily visible sense:
they stand between (1) parties to whom they are liable on deposit and other
(generally short-term) financial liabilities, and (2) end-users of funds who are
liable to them (generally on longer-term obligations). It is also trivially true that, in
this role, banks and other financial institutions engage in maturity, liquidity, and
risk transformation. The defining feature of what we call the “intermediated
scarce private capital myth” is not that it acknowledges such trivially true facts,
but that it inserts a fundamentally incorrect—and conceptually unnecessary—
assumption of unidirectional causality in explaining these phenomena. It assumes, often implicitly, that intermediated finance always originates with private
“savers” putting their finite pre-accumulated funds into the financial system.
That is the core assumption behind the intermediation myth that is fundamentally false. We show why in greater detail below, in connection with the mechanics
of bank lending. See infra Parts I and II.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN501.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 5

THE FINANCE FRANCHISE

26-JUL-17

10:09

1147

supply and consequent “capital glut.”9 In fact, since the 1980s,
credit-excess and consequent “searching for yield” by global
investors have produced multiple asset price boom-and-bust
cycles.10
This Article works to debunk the myth of finance as intermediated scarce private capital and offers an alternative, more
up-to-date theoretical framework for understanding the structure and operation of our financial system.11 We argue that,
contrary to contemporary orthodoxy, modern finance is not
primarily scarce, privately provided, and intermediated, but is,
in its most consequential respects, indefinitely extensible, publicly supplied, and publicly disseminated. At its core, the modern financial system is effectively a public-private partnership
that is most accurately, if unavoidably metaphorically, interpreted as a franchise arrangement. Pursuant to this arrangement, the sovereign public, as franchisor, effectively licenses
private financial institutions, as franchisees, to dispense a vital
and indefinitely extensible public resource: the sovereign’s full
faith and credit.
In the United States, public full faith and credit flows
through the financial system in two principal forms. The first
form comprises directly-issued public liabilities: mainly Federal Reserve notes and U.S. Treasury securities. The second,
quantitatively more significant yet less commonly recognized
form is publicly accommodated and monetized private liabilities. What we call “accommodation” occurs when a public authority—typically, the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”)—takes on a
9
Our baseline for terms like “glut” or “excess” is the quantum of investment
capital necessary to (1) fund reasonably pursuable improvements to material life,
and (2) provide adequate liquidity to secondary markets in financial instruments
associated with such projects. Anything more is excess, the measure of which can
be tracked, for example, in the ratio of secondary market transaction volume to
primary market capitalization. See infra Part VII.
10
See generally DANIEL ALPERT, THE AGE OF OVERSUPPLY (2013) (arguing that
the central challenge facing the global economy is the oversupply of labor, productive capacity, and capital relative to their demand); see Ben S. Bernanke, The
Global Savings Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit: Remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists (March 10, 2005), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/ [https://
perma.cc/7A73-M3JW]; Daniel Alpert, Robert Hockett, & Nouriel Roubini, The
Way Forward: Moving From the Post-Bubble, Post-Bust Economy to Renewed
Growth and Competitiveness, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (Oct. 11, 2011), http://
newamerica.net/publications/policy/the_way_forward [https://perma.cc/EC8NFAEG]. For a thorough catalogue and analysis of recent credit-fueled asset price
bubbles, see ERIK GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2013).
11
Our analysis will focus primarily on the United States. Our conclusions
are likely generalizable to other jurisdictions as well, but we do not explore that
prospect in this Article.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN501.txt

1148

unknown

Seq: 6

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

26-JUL-17

10:09

[Vol. 102:1143

privately-issued debt liability as a liability of its own.12 “Monetization” occurs when the ultimate beneficiary of accommodation is then able to spend the proceeds thereof as if they were
currency.13 When a public instrumentality directly or indirectly accommodates or monetizes a private liability, it effectively extends the full faith and credit of the sovereign—in this
case, the United States.
We argue that continuous public accommodation and
monetization of private liabilities constitute the key mechanisms through which continuous generation and distribution
of capital throughout the financial system occurs.14 To aid
understanding of these dynamics, we identify three analytically
distinct modes of generating and organizing financial flows: (1)
credit-intermediation; (2) credit-multiplication; and (3) creditgeneration. We show that what is routinely portrayed as the
universal dynamic of “financial intermediation”—namely, “oneto-one” private intermediation of a fixed quantum of pre-accumulated private funds—actually describes only a modest fraction of financial flows in contemporary financial systems. The
greater part of contemporary financial flows are generated and
multiplied in conformity to what we call the credit-multiplication (“one-to-many”) and credit-generation (“none-to-many”)
models. They are driven fundamentally by the sovereign public
that places its own full faith and credit behind the vast quantity
of private liabilities that it accommodates and monetizes.
Shifting focus from private intermediation to public accommodation and monetization as the key mechanisms of modern
finance yields a more accurate and coherent picture of the
structure and operation of the financial system. In this Article,
we begin the project of fully constructing that picture, tracing
the flow of the full faith and credit of the United States from the
banking sector that lies at the core of the franchise, up through
the surrounding layers of capital and shadow banking markets, all the way out to the disruptive fringe of high-tech
finance.15
12

See infra subpart II.B and Part IV.
See id.
14
We use the terms “finance,” “capital,” “credit,” etc. interchangeably and in
distinction from physical capital (plant, equipment) and “human capital” (human
skills and capacities). These terms generally refer to money claims conditionally
and temporarily conveyed by actor A to actor B, on the understanding that (1) B
will generate value through use of those claims, and (2) A will receive either a
share in that newly-generated value or a non-contingent premium for making the
claims temporarily available to B.
15
This picture of the financial system stands in marked contrast to the commonly accepted view of capital markets and shadow banking markets as largely
13
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Our re-conceptualization of modern finance as a hybrid
public-private franchise system bears potentially transformative analytic and normative implications. At the level of positive
theory, it reverses the core presumption that has long defined
and permeated the study of finance and financial policy-making: rather than falsely portraying private actors as sole suppliers of the finance capital that fuels economic growth, we show
that it is the sovereign public that ultimately generates and
underwrites capital flows in a modern financial system. At the
level of normative theory, by standing contemporary orthodoxy’s paradigmatic assumption on its head, our account
yields vitally important new understandings of the appropriate
roles of public and private actors in the financial system: private franchisees lever micro-informational advantages to assist
the public franchisor with the task of productively allocating its
full faith and credit, while the public franchisor, levering
macro-informational advantages, retains primary responsibility for preventing both under- and over-generation of credit
(i.e., modulating credit aggregates) and monitoring private
franchisees’ performance of their delegated credit-allocative
task.16 Finally, as a practical matter, redefining the financial
system’s core dynamics along the proposed lines allows for
more accurate, less superficial diagnoses of that system’s present dysfunctions, which fundamentally constitute manifestations of an underlying failure on the part of the franchisor to
modulate and oversee the allocation of credit. It also opens the
policy agenda to bolder and more comprehensive reform options for restoring a healthy relation between the financial and
“real” economies.17
independent, parallel alternatives to the banking system. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (2000) (describing bank-centered European and securities-market-centered Anglo-American financial
systems as “alternative models”).
16
See infra Part VII.
17
While our interpretation of the financial system as a public-private
franchise bears obvious normative implications, it is not meant itself to be a
normative theory, let alone an apologetic defense of the institutional status quo.
It is, rather, an unavoidably normatively inflected “best lights” interpretation of
the existing financial system’s characteristic operations. Our aim is to enable
that system to maximize its publicly beneficial performance potential, or to be the
best that it can be, given its current institutional structure. Of course, it is
important to acknowledge that even “the best that [our present arrangements] can
be” might ultimately not be good enough. For purposes of this Article, however,
we deliberately leave open the question whether present institutional arrangements might require wholesale replacement. For more on best-lights interpretation, see, generally, RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) (proposing that courts interpret the Constitution by
reference to moral principles to which broadly worded constitutional provisions

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN501.txt

1150

unknown

Seq: 8

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

26-JUL-17

10:09

[Vol. 102:1143

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the analytical framework on which our franchise view of finance is constructed. It defines and explains each of (a) our three models of
financial flows (credit-intermediation, credit-multiplication,
and credit-generation), and (b) the two key mechanisms
through which the public can underwrite private such flows
(accommodation and monetization).
In Parts II through VI, we use that framework as the basis
for developing our comprehensive interpretation of modern finance as a public-private franchise arrangement. Part II analyzes how the franchise dynamics operate in banking, which
constitutes the core of the system. Part III examines the variations of these dynamics that constitute contemporary capital
markets. Part IV focuses on shadow banking, which functionally integrates traditional banking and capital markets. Part V
supplements these functional accounts with essential institutional detail. It maps the critical regulatory and firm-level developments that have enabled capital and shadow banking
markets to amplify, then replicate core banking credit-generation functions. Part VI shows how new modes of high-tech
finance cohere with our model of franchise finance.
Finally, Part VII highlights some of the far-reaching normative implications of our view. It offers a novel interpretation of
the nature and underlying causes of financialization, and emphasizes the importance of explicitly recognizing the inherent
primacy of the public—the “franchisor”—in the public-private
finance franchise as the basis for more effective and sociallybeneficial policy-making.
I
THE FRANCHISE VIEW OF FINANCE: ANALYTIC FOUNDATIONS
This Part lays the foundation of our theory of modern finance as a public-private franchise. We show that only a fraction of modern finance actually flows in accordance with the
textbook version of financial intermediation.
A. Three Models of Finance
There are three ways in which finance can originate and
flow: what we call the (1) credit-intermediation (“one-to-one”);
can be viewed as giving expression); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 47 (1986)
(arguing that interpretation involves grasping that which is interpreted “in its best
light” and then “restructur[ing] it” in keeping with the “meaning” that must be
imposed upon it for it to emerge in its best light).
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(2) credit-multiplication (“one-to-many”); and (3) credit-generation (“none-to-many”) models.
1. The Credit-Intermediation Model
The “one-to-one” credit-intermediation model is the familiar image implicitly assumed by contemporary orthodoxy.18 In
this picture, that which is lent or invested is always something
that has been previously accumulated, hence is limited both by
the finite stock of the latter and by the willingness of its private
accumulators to invest it. Private parties essentially borrow
from or invest in one another, and one can only invest or borrow
what is “already there” in previously accumulated, privatelyowned form. In this model, financial institutions and markets
function primarily as sites of capital accumulation (where savers or “surplus units” keep their accumulated funds) and intermediated exchange (where savers and would-be users of capital
can inexpensively “find” and “monitor” one another).19
This orthodox view of how finance works is schematically
represented in Figure 1, in which the temporal (pre-accumulation) aspect of the process is depicted when read left to right,
and the intermediation (“one-to-one”) aspect is shown in the
equal sizes of the discs.
FIGURE 1
$

$
Suppliers
of Surplus
Funds

Users of
Surplus
Funds

Financial
Intermediary
Intermediary
Obligations

User
Obligations

If this standard textbook picture of intermediation were an
accurate representation of the entire financial system, then (a)
all financial institutions would effectively be variations on the
mutual fund form, and (b) all financial markets would effectively be variations on peer-to-peer lending platforms.20 This
observation alone suggests that the credit-intermediation
model might overlook something in modern financial systems.
At the very least, it overlooks banking.
18

See sources cited supra notes 1–5.
Id.; see also Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated
Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 393, 393–94 (1984); Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt,
99 J. POL. ECON. 689, 690–91 (1991).
20
See sources cited supra notes 1–5.
19

R
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2. The Credit-Multiplication Model
The most familiar counter-example posing a direct challenge to the “one-to-one” intermediation orthodoxy is the commercial bank that engages in so-called “fractional reserve
banking.”21 In the fractional reserve picture, the banking system lends out more than it receives in investor deposits.22 It
holds only enough of the latter to handle anticipated daily withdrawals or similar obligations, and lends out the rest. “The
rest,” crucially, serves as the basis of additional lending, so
that an originally deposited monetary “base” can be multiplied
many-fold. We accordingly call this picture the “one-to-many”
credit-multiplication model.23
This view of how finance works is schematically represented in Figure 2, in which the multiplicative (i.e., “one-tomany”) feature is represented by the larger size of the disc on
the right relative to the disc on the left.
FIGURE 2
$
$
Suppliers
of
“Reserves”

Financial
Institution
Institution
Obligations

Borrowers
Borrower
Obligations

The credit-multiplication model, were it accurately to capture much of what occurs in the financial system, would signif21
See CHESTER ARTHUR PHILLIPS, BANK CREDIT: A STUDY OF THE PRINCIPLES AND
FACTORS UNDERLYING ADVANCES MADE BY BANKS TO BORROWERS 165–69 (1920); PAUL
A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 464–65 (19th ed. 2010); JOSEPH
STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 732–34 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2d ed. 1997).
22
Demand deposits are typically viewed as callable loans extended to banks
by depositors. As explained below, however, loans made by banks also take the
form of demand deposits opened by lenders for their borrowers. Therefore, it is
potentially misleading to think of all deposits as loans to, as distinguished from
liabilities of, the bank. See infra subpart II.A.
23
The typical illustration of credit-multiplication through fractional reserve
banking begins with a bank that holds 10% of its deposit liabilities in reserve. The
remaining 90% is lent out, with borrowers depositing that remainder in their own
accounts in the banking system. The banks receiving this 90% as deposits lend
out another 90% of the amount received, and repeat this step until an initial
depository base is multiplied nine-fold in the aggregate. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,
GELDTHEORIE UND KONJUNKTURTHEORIE 90 (1929).
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icantly falsify the one-to-one credit-intermediation model.24
While the two models share the fundamental assumption that
finance capital must be pre-accumulated before credit can be
extended, the credit-multiplication model explicitly rejects that
only previously accumulated capital can be lent or invested. In
this picture, the aggregate funds lent or invested constitute a
multiple of the funds originally supplied by private savers, with
the multiplicative factor inversely proportional to the reserve
ratio.
These observations have two significant implications. The
first is that, for any x representing the percentage of pre-accumulated funds that financial institutions hold in reserve, “100
minus x” will represent the percentage of credit outstanding
that is not pre-accumulated capital.25 The multiplicative factor
effectively “levers up” previously accumulated funds and thus
diminishes putative capital scarcity proportionally, even if not
eliminating it entirely.
The second, more far-reaching implication is that, since
the “100 minus x” percent of credit outstanding is not preaccumulated and the x can in theory be made arbitrarily
small—even to the vanishing point—credit cannot be dependent upon privately pre-accumulated “loanable funds.”26 In
other words, finance capital need not actually be scarce even in
the more limited sense implied by the credit-multiplication
model. This takes us directly to the third model of financial
flows.
3. The Credit-Generation Model
The fact that x can be made arbitrarily small in the fractional reserve banking story raises the prospect that creditextension, and hence the supply of financial capital, might not
be scarce at all. Instead, it might be more accurate to view
lending institutions as generating finance capital, rather than
simply intermediating or even multiplying it. This is the prospect captured by what we call the “none-to-many” credit-generation model of finance.
24
This does not prevent some scholars from proffering the one-to-one intermediation and credit-multiplication models simultaneously. See, e.g., CARNELL ET
AL., supra note 2, at 45 (“[B]anks need to keep only a fraction of total deposits on
reserve as cash . . . [t]hey can invest the rest in loans or other illiquid but
profitable ventures. Only because of fractional reserves can banking be highly
profitable.”).
25
In the standard example cited above, this percentage would be 90%.
26
“Loanable funds” is the orthodox term-of-art for that which is pre-accumulated and then invested. See infra Part II.

R
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In the credit-generation picture, credit outstanding is not
fundamentally dependent upon—or, therefore, limited by—
pre-accumulated investment capital. It is limited only by investment opportunities that certain financial institutions—
namely, those authorized to credit or open borrower accounts
whose contents are spendable as money—view as potentially
profitable.27 In other words, credit is endogenous rather than
subject to exogenously given, pre-accumulated funds.28
This view is schematically represented in Figure 3, in which
the pre-accumulation factor disappears, and the indefinite extensibility of credit is represented by the enlarged sizes of the
discs to right and left: loan volume grows (on the right), and
loan proceeds are then deposited in accounts upon which borrowers may draw (on the left). It is important to note that, in
contrast to Figures 1 and 2, causation here runs from right to
left.29

27
The credit-generation model has a venerable pedigree and is probably the
oldest view of banking, shared by most bankers and central bankers even today.
This Article not only reasserts this view but also shows its applicability and
explanatory power with respect to a broader spectrum of financial activities beyond banking.
28
The classic texts on endogenous credit-money are HENRY THORNTON, AN
ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE PAPER CREDIT OF GREAT BRITAIN (F.A. v.
Hayek ed., A.M. Kelly 1965) (1802); KNUT WICKSELL, INTEREST AND PRICES (R.F. Kahn
trans., A.M. Kelly 1962) (1936); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (Redvers Opie trans., Harv. U. Press 1934) (1912).
29
As mentioned earlier, it is precisely this fact that the intermediated scarce
private capital myth overlooks. See supra note 8. The fact that the discs on the
left and right hand sides of the diagram are roughly equal in size reflects the
truisms that (a) the financial institution “stands between” parties to whom it is
obligated and parties that are obligated to it, (b) the institution’s liabilities and
owner equity roughly equate to its assets, and (c) the institution in that sense
“intermediates” between obligors and obligees. But this is a matter of accounting
identities, and in that sense is only trivially true: it tells us nothing about causal
directionality. For the latter, we must turn to the mechanics of actual lending and
deposit-opening. See infra Part II. There we find that, contrary to what is simply
assumed by the intermediated scarce private capital orthodoxy, causation runs
primarily from lending to deposit-opening, not the other way around—and that,
consequently, obligors and obligees are often the very same parties.

R
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Another important element of the credit-generation picture
is that, as noted above, the financial institution in its center is
authorized to credit or open borrower accounts spendable as
money.30 This capacity, represented on the left-hand side of
Figure 3, proves critical in demonstrating the falsity of another
implicit assumption behind the intermediation orthodoxy: that
finance is primarily, if not exclusively, privately accumulated
and supplied.31 These two conditions—“authorization” and
“spendability as money”—signal a foundational role played by
the public in generating and sustaining financial flows.32
B. Public Underwriting of “Private” Finance:
Accommodation and Monetization
Where credit flows conform to the multiplication or generation models, as they do in all modern financial systems, the
public inevitably becomes the financial system’s principal protagonist. Here, we explain why and how this happens.
As noted above, the public enters the realm of finance in
two primary capacities and for two primary reasons: (1) as the
source of legal authorization and oversight of financial institutions multiplying or generating credit; and (2) as the guarantor
of the money-like “spendability” of deposits held by such institutions.33 The public must act in these capacities in order to
provide an elastic currency and a payments system: indispensable public goods fundamentally dependent on the continuing
functioning of financial institutions that multiply or generate
credit-money.
30
31
32
33

CASU ET AL., supra note 2, at 22–25.
Id. at 59–63.
Id. at 196.
See supra text accompanying notes 12–13.
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This explains why any modern financial system, in which
credit flows primarily in conformity with the multiplication or
generation models, constitutes a public-private franchise arrangement. To reap the growth benefits of expandable yet stable credit-money and a payments system, it becomes
imperative that the sovereign undertake ex ante to recognize
certain private liabilities associated with credit-multiplication
or -generation as liabilities of its own.34 It is equally imperative
that these publicly-accommodated private liabilities be freely
spendable as money. That takes us to the phenomena of what
we call “accommodation” and “monetization.”
Accommodation and monetization are the two principal
mechanisms through which the sovereign enables credit to be
indefinitely generated in immediately spendable form, by committing ex ante to convert certain private liabilities into public
liabilities that serve as money.35 It is by virtue of performing
these twin acts of accommodation and monetization of privately-issued liabilities that the sovereign becomes a de facto
franchisor. As Parts II through IV will demonstrate in detail,
the principal components of modern financial systems jointly
constitute such franchise arrangements.36 Under the terms of
each such arrangement, the sovereign public, as franchisor,
effectively licenses private financial institutions, as franchisees, to dispense what it pre-commits to convert into the sovereign’s own monetized full faith and credit.
This arrangement is schematically represented in Figure 4,
in which a financial institution extends credit-money to borrowers in exchange for borrower liabilities, then monetizes
those liabilities through a public institution. The latter “accommodates” the initial credit extensions by crediting lending
institution accounts through which drafts clear.37
34
This does not refer solely to deposit insurance mechanisms. As described
below, more important is the sovereign’s guaranteed clearing of drafts drawn on
accounts. See infra Part II.
35
See generally Michael McLeay et al., Money Creation in the Modern Economy, BANK ENG. Q. BULL., Q1 2014, at 2–12, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q1prereleasemoneycreation.pdf [http://perma.cc/R29Q-MX28] (describing the role of the central bank in
money-generation).
36
This is generally true of jurisdictions that issue their own currencies and
rely upon stable credit-multiplication or -generation to maintain economic
growth. See infra subpart II.B.
37
See infra Part II for further detail on these mechanics. Note that, in contrast to Figures 1 and 2, where credit flows originate on the left-hand side and
work their way to the right, Figure 4 depicts a double-movement. On the one
hand, flows originate on the right and proceed simultaneously leftward and upward. On the other hand, the public’s pre-committing to what occurs at the top
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The Fed and the Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) are
the two principal federal instrumentalities that act on behalf of
the American public as sovereign franchisor in channeling the
flow of public full faith and credit throughout the financial
system.38 Their actions are most readily observable in the
banking sector, where the Fed directly and routinely accommodates and monetizes both public and private credit.39 The
same dynamics, however, are also at work in the capital and
other financial markets.40 Thus, Fed-accommodated bank
credit directly flows through those markets. The Fed also directly accommodates the monetized credit generated in the socalled shadow banking sector. Furthermore, U.S. Treasury
debt—directly issued, securitized full faith and credit of the
United States—plays a critical role in underwriting private financial flows in those markets. Tracing these dynamics in
greater detail helps to reveal the operative logic of finance as a
public-private franchise.
enables the great bulk of what occurs on the right, and hence on the left, to occur
at all.
38
Other public instrumentalities that perform these functions in more narrowly drawn circumstances include, e.g., the government sponsored enterprises
(“GSEs”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). We note their
roles at relevant points below, but concentrate mainly upon the Fed and the
Treasury.
39
See infra Part II.
40
See infra Parts III–V.
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II
THE CORE OF THE FRANCHISE: BANKS, CENTRAL BANKS,
FULL FAITH & CREDIT
The intermediation orthodoxy portrays banks as paradigmatic financial intermediaries operating as depicted in Figure 1
above. They are said to engage in qualitative asset transformation, enabling depositors’ privately-supplied, short-term loanable funds to finance longer-term lending on a scale required in
a modern economy.41 This Part shows that view to be false,
notwithstanding the truth of the truism that a bank’s liabilities
comprise primarily short-term demand deposits while its assets comprise mainly longer-term loans and fixed-income securities.42 Contrary to the intermediation myth, a modern
bank’s primary—or “special”—role is that of licensed private
purveyor of the public full faith and credit as depicted in Figure
4 above.43
A. Banks: Loans Make Deposits
According to the orthodox view of financial intermediation,
banks link accumulators of surplus capital with households,
firms, and sometimes government instrumentalities that require temporary access to this capital.44 In this model, a finite
quantity of exogenously given, privately pre-accumulated finance capital is deposited in banks in the form of short-term
deposits and is subsequently used by banks to finance, on a
simple pass-through (“one-to-one”) basis, long-term loans to
those who make productive use of that capital. This view of
banking is a straightforward variation on the generic intermediation model in Figure 1, as depicted in Figure 5.
41
See Bryan Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?, THE REG’L ECON., Oct. 2011, at 8 (explaining qualitative asset transformation); see also supra notes 2–5; STUART I. GREENBAUM & ANJAN V. THAKOR,
CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 55–58 (2d ed. 2007).
42
Focusing on this trivially true fact of “qualitative asset transformation”—
i.e., the transformation of maturities, liquidity, or risk associated with the two
sides of a financial institution’s balance sheet—often obscures the pernicious
causal assumption embedded in the orthodox view of financial intermediation.
That banks engage in maturity, liquidity, and risk transformation is both true and
irrelevant to our argument: it is the assumption of a specific causal directionality
that defines the orthodox view of banking and explains why that view is incorrect.
See supra notes 8, 29.
43
The word “special” is something of a term of art in bank-regulatory parlance. See, e.g., E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REP. 1982 (Jan. 1, 1983); E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? A
Revisitation, THE REGION, Mar. 1, 2000, at 14.
44
See supra notes 2–5.

R
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This is the essence of the “loanable funds” model of banking, pursuant to which “deposits make loans,” savings determine investment, and funding costs are simply prices (or
money rental rates) determined by the familiar confluence of
supply of and demand for privately-provided funds.45 Despite
its well-established status, however, this intermediated loanable funds view of banking is fundamentally incorrect. Outlining the mechanics of a simple bank lending transaction reveals
how the orthodox view, in fact, reverses the causal directionality of actual banking relations.
When a bank receives a loan application from a
creditworthy business or household, the bank does not peer
into a vault to determine how much in the way of depositors’
funds are on hand to lend out to others, then put available
such funds at the disposal of the borrower. Nor does the bank
engage in any contemporary analogue to that act, like checking
its reserve balance at the regional Federal Reserve Bank and
then using the available balance to transfer funds to the borrower.46 The bank simply credits a checkable borrower account (either newly opened or pre-existing), then books this
transaction as an asset and a liability of its own, on the one
hand, and an asset and a liability of the borrower, on the other
hand.47
The transaction books as an asset of the bank because the
bank is now owed on the loan: it holds a promissory note issued by the borrower. It books as a liability of the bank because the bank must now honor all drafts drawn on account by
45
See M. G. Hayes, The Loanable Funds Fallacy: Saving, Finance, and Equilibrium, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 807, 812 (2010) (describing the “loanable funds”
model of banking); L. Randall Wray, Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest, 16
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 69, 85 (1992) (characterizing the conventional model as one in
which exogenously determined “deposits make loans”).
46
The latter prospect is envisaged by the credit-multiplication model described supra section I.A.2.
47
On the basic mechanics of bank lending, see McLeay et al., supra note 35,
at 2–8.
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the borrower up to the loan amount. At the same time, the
transaction books as an asset of the borrower because the
borrower now owns, and is able to draw upon, a new or newly
credited account. It books as a liability of the borrower because the borrower must repay the bank in accordance with
the terms of the promissory note.
As a matter of accounting, there is obviously a one-to-one
correspondence between assets and liabilities, which by accounting convention always are mutually offsetting.48 Nevertheless, as a result of this simple transaction, there is now
more money at work in the economy, as routinely tracked by
the “broad money” measures.49 In making the original loan,
the bank has temporarily created a form of credit-money seemingly out of the proverbial “thin air.”50 It has not simply transferred a preexistent quantum of loanable funds from depositors
to borrower, thereby intermediating between them on the
model of Figures 1 and 5. It has temporarily increased—for as
long as the loan remains outstanding—the aggregate creditmoney supply, i.e., the supply of finance capital, along the lines
pictured generically in Figure 3 and now more specifically in
Figure 6.
FIGURE 6
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As Figure 6 makes clear, this process is not reducible to
mere credit-multiplication in the form of fractional reserve
banking, described above.51 Contrary to the credit-multiplication view, it is not necessary for banks to accumulate privatelysupplied deposits as the requisite base to be multiplied
48

Id. at 3.
Id. “Broad money” is “a measure of the total amount of money held by
households and companies in the economy” and includes “bank deposits” and
“currency.” Id. at 2.
50
Of course, as we show below, banks do not possess any magical ability to
create credit-money “out of thin air”—they merely monetize the sovereign public’s
full faith and credit. See infra subpart II.B.
51
See supra section I.A.2.
49
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through lending. Deposits do not make loans: loans make
deposits.
This finds stark regulatory expression in the fact that bank
reserve requirements serve purely as a liquidity-maintenance
measure of no direct relevance to the process of money-creation.52 Even the introduction of capital regulation, which limits
bank investments to a multiple of shareholder equity (rather
than deposits) as a means of protecting bank solvency and/or
limiting economy-wide leverage, does not appreciably alter the
causal relation between bank assets and liabilities. Violation of
such requirements will trigger regulatory sanctions, but will
not retroactively cancel any accomplished act of credit-extension—hence money-generation—by a banking institution.53 In
that sense, neither reserve nor capital requirements function
as inherent or natural limits on bank lending: they are simply
regulatory tools through which the sovereign modulates the
aggregate quantity of credit—and, ultimately, the sovereign’s
own full faith and credit—circulating throughout the
economy.54
B. Central Banks: Deposits Are Money
As if to underscore this last point, the central bank or
monetary authority has to accommodate this act of moneycreation undertaken by the privately-owned lending bank. Ac52
Many financially well-developed jurisdictions—notably, the U.K. and Canada—impose no reserve requirements on banks. See McLeay et al., supra note
35, at 3, n.2 (noting absence of reserve requirements in U.K.); Robert H. Rasche,
Reserve Requirements and Monetary Policy, CENT. BANKER, Spring 1999, https://
www.stlouisfed.org/publications/central-banker/spring-1999/reserve-requirements-and-monetary-policy [http://perma.cc/T3AW-T8DZ] (noting Canada’s abolition of reserve requirements).
53
The bank maintains compliance with reserve requirements either by lending less, by seeking more deposits, or by borrowing in the (typically overnight)
interbank lending market. It is essentially because deposit funding is less expensive than interbank borrowing that banks seek deposits, even though they do not
depend on deposits as sources of loanable funds. In other words, banks seek
deposits simply because the franchisor—the public, via the central bank—modulates the dispensing of its resource partly by reference to deposited funds. The
bank generally maintains compliance with capital requirements either by lending/investing less, by reducing the risk of its asset portfolio, or by issuing equity.
See, e.g., John Carney, Basics of Banking: Loans Create a Lot More Than Deposits,
CNBC (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100497710 [http://perma.cc/
UWP3-78ZF] (explaining how banks comply with reserve requirements).
54
It is worth emphasizing here that capital requirements in particular are a
critically important regulatory tool for modulating the private generation of credit
by banks, especially if such requirements are set at appropriately high levels. For
a compelling argument that capital requirements should be much higher than
they are presently, see ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKER’S NEW CLOTHES
6–9 (2013).
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commodation is the act by which the central bank transforms a
private liability (that of the lending bank) into a public liability
(that of the central bank). It does so by crediting a reserve
account in the name of the lending bank, and thereby enabling
checks drawn on the new (or newly augmented) account by the
original borrower from the bank to clear.
Schematically, central bank accommodation transforms
Figures 3 and 6 above into a more accurate picture in Figures 4
and 7.
FIGURE 7
Central Bank

Borrower
Obligations

$ Accommodation

$ Borrower
Accounts
Depositors
(Including
Borrowers)

$
Borrowers
Bank

$
Borrower
Obligations

Central bank accommodation is an unavoidable result of
the fact that, in most modern economies, the central bank or
monetary authority maintains an overnight interbank lending
rate target and/or administers a payments infrastructure on
which privately drawn checks clear at par.55 Without accommodation, some checks drawn on lending banks would fail to
clear. That would undermine the payments system and, with
it, the essential functioning of the real economy.56 Central
55
For a general overview of the Fed’s role in maintaining interbank lending
rates and administering the U.S. payments system, see BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES.
SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS (10th ed. 2016), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/23D7-NJFL].
56
For more on these mechanics, see Jaromir Benes & Michael Kumhof, The
Chicago Plan Revisited (IMF, Working Paper No. 12/202, 2012); Ulrich Bindseil,
The Operational Target of Monetary Policy and the Rise and Fall of the Reserve
Position Doctrine (Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 372, 2004); Piti Disyatat,
Monetary Policy Implementation: Misconceptions and Their Consequences (Bank
for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 269, 2008).
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banks are accordingly constrained to accommodate to ensure
effective clearing, hence to ensure smooth transacting.
Because the central bank’s crediting of the lending bank’s
reserve account also enables borrowers to spend out of their
new or newly credited demand deposit accounts, the act of
accommodation here also amounts to an act of monetization.57
The central bank is in effect publicly monetizing the privately
issued promissory note that has been signed by the individual
borrower in favor of the lending bank. By publicly monetizing a
privately-issued financial instrument, the central bank is placing the full faith and credit of the nation behind the credit of the
individual.
To put the point differently, the private borrower “securitizes” her own creditworthiness in issuing her promissory note
to the private bank, while the public central bank in turn “monetizes” that promissory note in “accommodating” the private
bank’s act of crediting the private borrower’s account.58 In this
sense, the private bank is simply assisting the public central
bank in deciding which privately-issued promissory notes to
monetize. The interest it earns on the loan is its payment—its
privatized seigniorage—for assisting the central bank in this
allocation of the public’s full faith and credit.59 In effect, not
only do loans make private deposits, rather than the other way
round, but privately originated loans can also make public central bank reserves, rather than the other way round.60
The “public” central bank, operating in part through the
“private” banks, thus enables us collectively to “spot one an57
Robert C. Hockett & Saule Omarova, Challenging the Financial Intermediation Myth, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 17, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.
edu/2016/10/17/challenging-the-myth-of-financial-intermediation/ [https://
perma.cc/K8RA-ZN4V].
58
For a more technical description of securitization, see infra Part III.
59
“Seigniorage” denotes the benefit traditionally enjoyed by a sovereign that
issues its own currency in virtue of its being able to “produce” ad libitum that
which it “spends” in commanding goods and services. See, e.g., Definition of
Seigniorage, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/term?term=seigniorage [https://
perma.cc/S5D3-CC4Q] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). Where the sovereign is the
sole authorized issuer, seigniorage is in the nature of a rent. As its etymology
suggests, the term goes back a long way. The most straightforward contemporary
instance of seigniorage is that in which a sovereign issues, e.g., a $1 bill that costs
it 5 cents to print. In such case, the seigniorage is 95 cents. The money-issuance
we discuss below is not that involving “money printing” but, rather, lending,
which we shall see creates what is known now as “credit-money” or “bankmoney.” Id.
60
Seth Carpenter & Selva Demiralp, Money, Reserves, and the Transmission
of Monetary Policy: Does the Money Multiplier Exist?, 34 J. MACROECON. 59 (2012);
Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Business Cycles: Real Facts and a Monetary Myth, 14 FED. RES. BANK. OF MINN. Q. REV. 3, 9 (1990).
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other credit” individually, as we jointly and severally work to
improve our material lives over time. It is all a matter of ex ante
gatekeeping by private banking institutions acting pursuant to
publicly provided guidelines, followed by ex post accommodation and monetization by the public’s agent—the central bank
or monetary authority.61 Ultimately, private banks are purveying public credit.
As privileged purveyors of the monetized full faith and
credit of the Unites States, explicitly accommodated and protected by the central bank, privately owned banks constitute
the inner core of the financial system.62 Not surprisingly, other
financial institutions and markets tend to grow around, attach
themselves to, and even attempt functional amplification and
replication of the core banking franchise. However, they often
do so without paying the “franchise fees” imposed on banks in
the form of chartering conditionality and close regulation.63
That takes us on to the capital and shadow banking markets.

61
See FDIC, Privatizing Deposit Insurance: Results of the 2006 FDIC Study, 1
FDIC Q. 23, 26 (2007). Serious violations of the guidelines can result in withdrawal of bank charters but not a refusal to accommodate and monetize loans
already extended. COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ADMINISTERED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE 11 (2000).
62
In a similar vein, Morgan Ricks calls the formal banking system a “joint
venture” between the state and private institutions, i.e., banks, to which the state
grants the exclusive legal privilege of creating money by issuing deposit liabilities.
See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, Money and (Shadow) Banking: A Thought Experiment, 31
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 731, 743 (2011–2012) (“[O]ur existing system of depository
banking can be understood as a joint venture with the state for the efficient
distribution of the money supply.”). While Ricks focuses on short-term bank and
“shadow bank” liabilities as sites of money-creation, our work focuses on bank
and “shadow bank” assets as sites of publicly “accommodated” credit-moneyexpansion. In our view, the modulation and productive allocation of the latter is
as urgent a long-term policy concern as the “panic-proofing” of short-term funding markets that motivates Professor Ricks’ proposals. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, A
Simpler Approach to Financial Reform, REGULATION 36, 36 (Winter 2013–2014)
(“The licensed money approach is designed to render the financial system panicproof.”). For a book-length account of Ricks’ approach, see MORGAN RICKS, THE
MONEY PROBLEM (2016).
63
The conventional explanation of bank regulation portrays the standard
regulatory requirements—chartering, enumerated powers, portfolio regulation,
capital regulation, and expedited liquidation in bankruptcy—as strings attached
to receipt of federal deposit insurance. While this is correct, it tends to overlook
the fact that bank regulation antedates deposit insurance, precisely because
banks are granted credit-money-generation authority. FDIC, supra note 61, at
26.
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III
CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE BANKING CORE: PUBLIC
CREDIT UNDERWRITES PRIVATE CREDIT
The precise channels through which public credit flows
outside the formal banking system are more subtle and difficult to trace than the mechanics of traditional banking, described above. This fact partly accounts for the persistence of
the intermediated-scarce-private-capital myth in descriptions
of the operation of the capital and money markets.64 However,
a careful examination of the underlying dynamics in these markets reveals the essential role of the public’s full faith and
credit in generating and amplifying private financial flows.
This Part traces these core dynamics in capital markets, while
Part IV focuses specifically on the shadow-banking sector.
A. Transactional Links Between Capital Markets and
Banking
On the orthodox understanding, capital markets function
as sites for bringing together those who have pre-accumulated
scarce private capital and those—primarily firms—that seek
capital to finance their growth and operations. Credit thus
flows in accordance with the one-to-one intermediation model,
discussed in section I.A.1 and illustrated in Figures 1 and 5
above. All that changes is the nomenclature, as depicted in
Figure 8.
FIGURE 8
$

$
Capital
Market

Investors
Securities

Issuers
Securities

In this picture, capital markets functionally replace individual financial institutions, such as banks, as intermediaries
of financial flows.65 Just like banks or other financial intermediaries, capital markets minimize participants’ “search
64
“Money markets” are conventionally understood as markets in instruments with maturities of one year or less. “Capital markets” are markets in
instruments with maturities greater than one year.
65
This is another way of saying that, in this view of finance, capital markets
“disintermediate” banks by providing alternative channels for borrowers and savers to transact with one another on a more directly “peer-to-peer” basis. As we
argue below, this commonly encountered notion of disintermediation captures
only certain superficial differences between capital and banking markets but
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costs” and “monitoring costs,” via such markets’ “price discovery” function.66 Importantly, however, capital markets’ ability
to reduce these transaction costs does not, in and of itself,
serve as a proof that the one-to-one intermediation model accurately describes how these markets operate: searching and
monitoring must be done by investors who borrow to invest just
as by investors who deploy pre-accumulated funds to invest. In
fact, there are many reasons to doubt the orthodox view of
capital markets as pure sites of one-to-one intermediation. For
example, growing volumes of corporate “stock-buyback” activity in recent decades indicate that modern firms are not as
dependent on diffuse investor-supplied capital in financing
their operations as orthodoxy postulates them to be.67
But there is an even more directly visible link between the
capital and banking markets, which shows the limited reach of
the orthodox intermediation narrative. That narrative ignores
the basic fact that capital market investors—not only financial
institutions but also ordinary investing individuals—are able to
finance their purchases of securities in capital markets by borrowing (directly or indirectly) from banks, in accordance with
the model in Part II above.68 To the extent such levered investing is a basic fact of the capital markets, it defies the fundamental assumption that “accumulators” of scarce funds
directly finance issuing firms.69 It shows that capital market
investors themselves often act as the true “intermediaries” in
the process of transferring capital from banks—the ultimate
“investors” in securities purchased with the money borrowed
from them—to firms.
Of course, banks’ involvement as the ultimate source of
capital that is being “intermediated” in capital markets directly
implicates public accommodation and monetization, discussed
above. Accordingly, the process can be schematically represented by combining Figures 7 and 8, as shown in Figure 9.
overlooks the underlying mechanisms through which these markets are deeply
integrated.
66
This crucial “price discovery” function is performed mainly by secondary
markets, in which many parties buy and sell previously issued securities on the
basis of continuously leaking, value-germane information. Indeed, one of the
cardinal advantages of this “disintermediated” mode of finance is said to be its
efficiency in aggregating information, which no single intermediary can match.
67
See William Lazonick, Profits without Prosperity: Stock Buybacks Manipulate the Market and Leave Most Americans Worse Off, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014,
at 46, 47–51.
68
See infra subpart V.C for more on the law and mechanics of margin
lending.
69
Hockett & Omarova, supra note 57.
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FIGURE 9
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In most modern jurisdictions, this type of “margin lending”—extensions of credit for the purpose of purchasing securities—is limited by regulation, which historically emerged in
response to financial asset-price bubbles and busts brought
about by procyclical endogenous-money creation.70 But this is
precisely the point. Margin lending is regulated because it is a
conduit through which indefinitely extensible public full faith
and credit finds its way into the capital markets, via the banking (or shadow banking) channels.71 In effect, margin regulation signals implicit recognition of the basic fact that what
flows through capital markets is not primarily scarce pre-accumulated funds but the public’s own full faith and credit—a
potent financial fuel prone to over-generation and misallocation by its private purveyor-institutions.72
Public credit also flows through capital markets in a variety
of less readily visible forms. As we show below, public full faith
and credit serves to underwrite putatively private finance in the
capital markets. In this case, however, the full faith and credit
is not monetized by the central bank but securitized—in the
70
In the U.S., margin regulation was introduced in the wake of the market
crash of 1929 in order to curb securities speculation fueled by cheap credit. See
infra Part V.
71
For more on the “banking channel” and the “financial accelerator model” in
which it figures prominently, see Benjamin Bernanke et al., The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (1996); Nobuhiro Kiyotaki &
John Moore, Credit Cycles, 105 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1997).
72
This last point has significant policy implications, which we analyze below.
In our franchise view of finance, much financial regulation can be generally
viewed as a necessary safeguard against over-generation and misallocation of the
public franchisor’s full faith and credit by private franchisees. See infra Part VII.
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United States, through the operations of the U.S. Treasury and
certain government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”).73
B. Public Underwriting of “Private” Investment: Securitized
Full Faith & Credit
Capital and money markets appear to depend for their
emergence and continued functioning on massive issuances of
securitized public debt in the form of Treasury and related
government liabilities, such as GSE Agency securities. In these
markets, public debt liabilities function as a form of publicly
supplied “monetary base” that privately extended credit, in effect, “multiplies” along the lines of the credit-multiplication
model discussed in section I.A.2 and depicted in Figure 2.74
This claim bears an important causal-directionality implication.75 It implies that the large share of securities markets
represented by sovereign debt is not a matter of sovereigns with
massive government operations, and consequent borrowing
needs, taking advantage of pre-existing private market infrastructures to finance their operations.76 To the contrary, the
causal relation between government debt markets and markets
for privately-issued securities runs primarily in the other direction. Large sovereign debt markets are effectively prerequisites
to the emergence and sustenance of large private debt and
equity markets.
73
As discussed below, public securities are then monetized via Fed operations and shadow banking transactions.
74
“Monetary base” is the term of art that denotes the supply of Federal
Reserve notes and reserve liabilities in the banking system. See Philip Cagan,
High-Powered Money, in DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE STOCK OF
MONEY, 1875–1960 45 (1965) http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1642.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PXQ6-3MFH]. The concept of the “base” is thus at home in the “creditmultiplication” model. While this model does not accurately portray banking, we
shall see that it captures certain dynamics in some segments of the capital and
“shadow banking” markets.
75
This is analogous to the causality-reversing claim in Part II that loans
make deposits more than deposits make loans.
76
A few figures provide a preliminary grasp of the relative market shares of
public and private debt. Thus, of the approximately $41 trillion in debt securities
held by Americans as of Q3 2016, less than one-third ($12.1 trillion) were U.S.
and foreign corporate bonds. See BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: SECOND QUARTER 2016 117, Table L.208 Line 1 (Dec.
8, 2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4YPU-T8CQ]; see also id. at 119–22 Tables L.210 through L.213. By
contrast, $15.6 trillion were U.S. Treasury securities, $8.4 trillion were Agency
securities, and $3.8 trillion were municipal government securities. Id. at 117
Table L.208 Lines 3–5. Government debt thus dominates privately-issued debt on
these markets by a factor of over 19 to 12.
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Historically, the world’s first heavily-capitalized securities
exchanges—those in Amsterdam,77 London,78 Paris79 and New
York80—emerged either as outright government instrumentalities, as adjuncts to government instrumentalities, or as sites
for trading in government-issued debt. Numerous other European and Asian securities exchanges followed a similar path.81
Far more important than historical correlations, however, is
modern capital markets’ functional dependence upon treasury
and government agency liabilities—a dependence that mirrors
bank lending markets’ dependence upon central bank liabilities.82 This indispensability of securitized sovereign full faith
and credit in the capital and money markets stems from three
related critical roles that sovereign liabilities play in these markets: their roles as ultimate reserve assets, price benchmarks,
and shadow-bank “base money.”

77
Amsterdam Exchange was established by statute as a trading platform for
shares in Dutch East India Company, a government instrumentality. See JAN DE
VRIES & ANDREAS VAN DER WOUDE, THE FIRST MODERN ECONOMY: SUCCESS, FAILURE,
AND PERSEVERANCE OF THE DUTCH ECONOMY, 1500–1815 (1997); LODEWIJK PETRAM,
THE WORLD’S FIRST STOCK EXCHANGE: HOW THE AMSTERDAM MARKET FOR DUTCH EAST
INDIA COMPANY SHARES BECAME A MODERN SECURITIES MARKET (Lynne Richards
trans., Colum. Univ. Press 2014) (2011).
78
RANALD C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY (1999); JOHN
BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY, AND THE ENGLISH STATE 1688–1783
(1990); STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS 1690–1860 (2002).
79
PIERRE-JEAN LEHMANN, HISTOIRE DE LA BOURSE DE PARIS (1997).
80
CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY (2d ed., 2012); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, THE FOUNDERS AND FINANCE: HOW HAMILTON, GALLATIN, AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS
FORGED A NEW ECONOMY (2012).
81
Frankfurt’s exchange emerged as a site for the exchange of sovereign currencies. See Deutsche Börse Group, History of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange
https://deutsche-boerse.com/dbg/dispatch/en/kir/dbg_nav/about_us/20_
FWB_Frankfurt_Stock_Exchange/70_History_of_the_FWB [https://perma.cc/
4SFT-4VJ2] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Tokyo’s began as a site for the trading of
government bonds issued to former Samurai in the late 19th century. See Tokyo
Stock Exchange ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Tokyo-Stock-Exchange [https://perma.cc/B5FU-8B6E] (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
Shanghai’s and Seoul’s began their lives as state-established sites for the jumpstarting of domestic industrial development. See W. A. THOMAS, WESTERN CAPITALISM IN CHINA: A HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (2001).
82
See Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher U.S Sec. and Exch. Comm’n,
Speech: A Watched Pot Never Boils: The Need for SEC Supervision of Fixed Income
Liquidity, Market Structure, and Pension Accounting (March 10, 2015), https://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/031015-spch-cdmg.html [https://perma.cc/B2KQHKB7].
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1. Government Securities as Necessary Liquidity
Reservoir
The first role can be labeled the “safe asset” role.83 Securities markets appear to require for their stable functioning a
liquidity or quasi-liquidity reservoir into which investor funds
can be rechanneled during times of turbulence.84 Sovereign
debt obligations, backed by the full faith and credit of their
issuers, are the principal form that liquidity takes in these
markets—much as publicly-accommodated bank credit-money
is the form that liquidity takes in other markets. They constitute the reserve asset in securities markets—much as central
bank reserves constitute, by definition, the reserve asset in
banking markets.85
In this sense, U.S. Treasury and GSE debt can be modeled
as the securities markets’ rendition of multipliable bankingmarket “base money,” functioning as a close money substitute.86 This accounts for striking empirical findings to the ef83
There is a growing literature on so-called “safe assets,” and government
liabilities as “safest of the safe.” See Marcus Brunnermeier & Valentin Haddad,
Safe Assets, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.newyorkfed
.org/medialibrary/media/aboutthefed/pdf/FAR_Oct2014.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9D25-XTW5]; Gary Gorton et al., The Safe-Asset Share, 102 AM. ECON. REV.
101 (2012); Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Olivier Jeanne, Global Safe Assets (Bank
for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 399, 2012), http://www.bis.org/events/
conf120621/gourinchas_presentation_new.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRZ6-9J78];
Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for
Treasury Debt (May 12, 2010), https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizationalstructure/offices/RoundTable/2011%20session%204%20vissing_tsy%20de
mand%20PAPER.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF98-TZVB]; Garry J. Schinasi et al., Financial Implications of the Shrinking Supply of U.S. Treasury Securities (IMF,
Working Paper WP/01/61, May 2001), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
supply/2001/eng/032001.PDF [https://perma.cc/Y6QU-X8RB]. On the role of
law in constructing “safe assets,” see Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe
Assets (working paper, Sept. 2, 2015, on file with the authors).
84
Schinasi et al., supra note 83, at 15, echo others in calling this public debt
instruments’ “near-money” role. This role is subtly distinct from the “cashequivalent” role played by very short-term debt, obtainable in the money markets
for corporate cash-management purposes. See infra Part IV.
85
Id.
86
Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 83, at 1 (“We show that
when the supply of Treasuries falls, the supply of bank-issued money . . . rises.
We show that the channel underlying this response is that a reduction in the
supply of Treasuries increases the prices of liquidity and safety, lowering the yield
on bank deposits, and inducing the banking sector to issue more deposits.”);
Schinasi et al., supra note 83, at 24 (“Government securities are close substitutes
for the currency of the issuing country. At very short maturities, [they] have little
market risk and thus are reliable stores of value. As a result, government securities are a medium of exchange—they are widely accepted as collateral against the
future delivery of cash (including transfers of central bank reserves and bank
deposits).”).
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fect that “safe assets”—government liabilities chief among
them—have represented a more or less constant share of global
financial assets over time, even as the latter have grown continuously over the decades to dwarf “real” global and domestic
GDP measures.87 Total financial market capitalization, in
other words, has for many decades now been a constant and
straightforward multiple of public debt, even as both of these
quanta have multiplied many-fold relative to the sizes of nonfinancial assets. This so-called “safe-asset share” represented
by the securitized public credit, in effect, functions as the
“high-powered money” of the capital markets.88 To put it another way, privately-intermediated credit appears to be a function of publicly-issued credit.
The role of the government as issuer of the key “safe asset”
in the capital markets is qualitatively different from its commonly recognized roles as the regulator of, or provider of “last
resort” assistance to, financial markets. A sufficiently deep
market in government securities seems to be a prerequisite to
the emergence and stable operation of sufficiently deep and
liquid markets in privately-issued securities. Investors appear
to require that there be a large stock of effectively “risk-free”
asset in any securities market, partly so as to be able to move
into the safe securities from securities seen as unsafe during
times of trouble. In this sense, government securities—e.g.,
U.S. Treasury debt—constitute the securities markets’ liquidity
reservoir.89
2. Government Securities as Necessary Benchmarks
The second, related, role played by government liabilities—
securitized public full faith and credit—in the capital markets
is that of indispensable “benchmarks” in pricing other, more
risky privately-issued securities. In fact, the very tools that
have spurred exponential growth of the securities markets
87
On the “safe asset share,” see Gorton et al., supra note 83, at 101. For the
share of the government debt in U.S. bond market capitalization, see BD. OF GOV.
OF FED. RES. SYS., supra note 76. See also SIFMA, Statistics Page (Sept. 4, 2015),
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx [https://perma.cc/F3R9-DGG6].
For counterpart global market measures, see, e.g., Charles Roxburgh et al., Mapping Global Capital Markets 2011, MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 2011), http://www.mc
kinsey.com/insights/global_capital_markets/mapping_global_capital_markets
_2011 [https://perma.cc/59KB-WKL9].
88
“High-powered money,” also known as the “monetary base,” is conventionally defined as currency and bank reserves. See Cagan, supra note 74.
89
DEPT. OF THE TREAS., JOINT REP. ON THE GOV’T SEC. MKT. (1992), https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/gsr92rpt.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V3UU-JCRQ].
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since the late 1960s—namely, modern asset-pricing methods
from CAPM through arbitrage pricing models—require for their
operation a postulated “risk-free” asset.90 Without this riskfree asset, a reliable pricing of privately-issued financial assets
is not only impractical—it is impossible.91
In U.S. as well as global capital markets, this “risk-free”
asset is the U.S. Treasury or GSE security, universally considered the safest of safe assets in its ready convertibility into
cash—i.e., into Federal Reserve notes—at par.92 Importantly,
the capacity of U.S. Treasury and GSE liabilities to play this
benchmark role—and the related “liquidity reservoir” role—requires not only that they be safe, but also that there be massive
issuances outstanding at any given moment. When the size of
the U.S. national debt shows signs of shrinking—as it did in
the late 1990s, for example—Treasuries’ reliability as
benchmarks declines. The result is that securities markets
become much more volatile and market-watchers worry about
the prospect of there being too little U.S. federal debt.93 Somewhat ironically against the backdrop of popular “austerity”
rhetoric, the Fed and White House economic teams have been
especially alarmed by this prospect.94
90
For more on the indispensable role played by a postulated “risk-free asset”
or “risk-free rate of return” in modern portfolio and asset pricing models, see
Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); James Tobin, Liquidity
Preference as Behavior Toward Risk, 25 REV. ECON. STUD. 65 (1958); Jack L.
Treynor, Towards a Theory of Market Value of Risky Assets (1962), reprinted in
ASSET PRICING AND PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE: MODELS, STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE
METRICS 15 (Robert A. Korajczyk ed., 1999); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset
Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425
(1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky
Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13
(1965); Jan Mossin, Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market, 34 ECONOMETRICA 768
(1966); Robert C. Merton, An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model, 41
ECONOMETRICA 867 (1973); Stephen Ross, The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset
Pricing, 13 J. ECON. THEORY 341 (1976). For more on the importance of U.S.
Treasury debt in this respect, see Schinasi et al., supra note 83, at 4–9, 13.
91
The sole partial exception here—the so-called “Black CAPM,” too unwieldy
for financial practitioners to employ in practice—effectively proves the rule. See
Fischer Black et al., The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests, in
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS 79 (Michael Jensen ed., 1972).
92
See Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 83; Schinasi et al.,
supra note 83, at 4–9, 13.
93
See Schinasi et al., supra note 83.
94
See Michael J. Fleming, The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market: Recent Performance and Possible Alternatives, FRBNY ECON. POL. REV., April 2000, http://
www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/00v06n1/0004flem.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S947C5J]. An unpublished document obtained by NPR offers an amusing (in retrospect) glimpse of Clinton Administration’s fears of the likely repercussions of
paying down the national debt. See ‘Life After Debt,’ Second Interagency Draft,
11/3/2000,http://media.npr.org/assets/img/2011/10/20/LifeAfterDebt.pdf
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That shortages of public debt are seen as a serious threat
to securities markets’ ability to thrive finds further evidence
outside the United States. Thus, Australia and South Africa
have in recent years been compelled to issue a new form of
government obligation to play the safe-asset role in capital
markets, despite the fact that their governments had no need of
further debt issuance to finance their fiscal operations.95 This
“Committed Liquidity Facility”96 is a dramatic illustration of the
proposition that securities markets need public liabilities, regardless of whether or not governments need debt financing.
3. Government Securities as Shadow-Bank “Base
Money”
The third role of securitized public full faith and credit in
the capital markets is what some scholars dub a “transaction
technology” and what we call shadow-bank “base money.”97 As
described below, Treasury and GSE securities serve as collateral in many transactions that functionally amplify or replicate
bank lending.98 These instruments are able to play this role
only because of their superior reliability, both as claims upon
future payouts and as benchmarks in calculating other asset
values.99
The demand for securitized public full faith and credit—
tradable Treasury and GSE liabilities—as lending collateral in
the securities markets appears to be so insistent that some
scholars have attributed the proliferation of mortgage- and
other asset-backed securities in the 1990s-early 2000s to the
[https://perma.cc/HPR7-6LS6]; see also Jason Kestenbaum, What if We Paid Off
the Debt? The Secret Government Report, NPR PLANET MONEY, (Oct. 20, 2011, 12:59
PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2011/10/21/141510617/what-ifwe-paid-off-the-debt-the-secret-government-report [https://perma.cc/K3S84SMT].
95
See Matthew C. Klein, Getting Around the ‘Safe Asset Shortage,’ Australian
Style, FT ALPHAVILLE (Jan. 13, 2015), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/01/13/
2085482/getting-around-the-safe-asset-shortage-australian-style/ [https://
perma.cc/Z76H-MKS5]; Izabella Kaminska, Manufacturing Quality Collateral, FT
ALPHAVILLE (Nov. 25, 2011), http://ftalphaville.ft.com//2011/11/25/765031/
manufacturing-quality-collateral/; South African Reserve Bank, Committed Liquidity Facility, https://www.resbank.co.za/Markets/Domestic/CommittedLiquidityFacility/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/C9AP-7GTJ] (last visited
Nov. 7, 2016).
96
See sources cited supra note 95; Guy Debelle, The Committed Liquidity
Facility, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS REV. (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.bis.org/
review/r111124d.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MZA-R6EP].
97
See Gorton et al., supra note 83; Gelpern & Gerding, supra note 83.
98
See infra Part IV.
99
See supra note 97; Schinasi et al., supra note 83 at 4–9, 14; RICKS, supra
note 62.

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN501.txt

1174

unknown

Seq: 32

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

26-JUL-17

10:09

[Vol. 102:1143

fact that there was not sufficient Treasury debt outstanding to
play the crucial role of lending-transaction technology.100 If
correct, this lends more weight to the proposition that securities market capitalization, and hence the securities markets’
share of credit aggregates, are functions of total Treasury and
GSE liabilities outstanding—much as credit aggregates in the
bank lending markets are a function of Fed liabilities in the
form of currency and member bank reserves.101
This essential role of public debt as the securities markets’
“base money” is fundamentally consistent with the credit-multiplication model, discussed in section I.A.2 and originally depicted in Figure 2, with public credit itself serving as the preaccumulated “base” that is “multiplied.” With this correction,
it is schematically represented in Figure 10.
FIGURE 10

Public
Debt
Treasury &
GSEs
$

$
Financial
Institutions
& Markets

Issuers
Financial
Securities

Figure 10 complements Figure 9 in showing how the sovereign’s full faith and credit works to magnify the volume of finance capital available to issuers in the capital markets.
Figure 9 represents the banking channel, through which monetized full faith and credit in the form of Fed (central bank)
liabilities grows the supply of finance capital (credit-money/
bank-money). Figure 10 depicts the public-debt channel,
through which securitized full faith and credit in the form of
Treasury and GSE liabilities further increases the supply of
finance capital (available investment funds).
This vital role of government debt as a form of high-powered money, on which larger credit-money aggregates are

100
See Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on
Repo (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 15223, Aug. 2009).
101
As discussed above, these reserves are the product of Fed accommodation
rather than actual deposits.
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levered, comes into a particularly sharp relief in the context of
“shadow banking.”102
IV
FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION OF BANKING AND CAPITAL
MARKETS: SHADOW BANKS
The financial crisis of 2007-09 drew widespread attention
to so-called “shadow banking,” which generally refers to credit
extension and maturity transformation outside of the regulated
banking system.103 The shadow banking sector is a crucial
channel of credit-money proliferation, with lending volumes rivaling those of the traditional banking sector.104 This Part argues that the phenomenal growth of the shadow banking
markets reflects the fact that these markets ultimately operate
in conformity with the credit-generation model, whereby private liabilities generated in the shadow banking markets are
publicly accommodated and monetized. Accordingly, we define
and analyze shadow banking by reference to specific mechanisms through which capital and money markets amplify and
functionally replicate the role of banking and Treasury securities markets as channels for dispensing the sovereign’s full
faith and credit. This Part maps the flow of monetized and
securitized public full faith and credit through the key subsectors of the shadow banking sector.
A. Securitization & Repo Markets
Bank-reminiscent dynamics are intuitively easiest to grasp
in the securitization and repo markets. “Securitization” generally refers to the practice of pooling revenue-generating assets,
such as commercial or mortgage loans and using the pooled
assets as collateral backing the issuance of debt securities to
102
Use of the phrase “high-powered money,” another term for the “monetary
base,” is the Fed’s way of communicating this money aggregate’s multiplicative
properties. See Cagan, supra note 74.
103
The term was coined by Paul McCulley. Paul McCulley, Teton Reflections,
GLOBAL CENTRAL BANK FOCUS (PIMCO) (Sept. 1, 2007) at 2, http://easysite.com
monwealth.com/EasySites/EasySite_Z3263Y/_uploads/Teton%20Reflections.
pdf [https://perma.cc/XE3T-636F]; see also Bryan Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is
Shadow Banking Really Banking?, THE REG’L ECON., Oct. 2011, at 8.
104
As of Q3 2016, shadow-banking assets totaled at approximately $7.2 trillion, while commercial bank loan assets came in at approximately $10 trillion. We
break down the shadow-banking figure into its component parts below, taking our
data from BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS., supra note 76. For the bank loan figure,
see BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS., supra note 76, at 123 Table L.214 Line 18, 124
Table L.215 Line 15, 126 Table L.217 Line 19, 129 Table L.222 Line 7.
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investors.105 A securities “sale and repurchase agreement,” or
“repo,” is a transaction in which a cash borrower sells certain
financial assets to a lender and commits to repurchase the
same assets within a short period of time at a higher price.106
Examining these two markets side-by-side reveals that they
operate in accordance with the credit-multiplication and
credit-generation models, discussed above, by amplifying and
replicating publicly accommodated and monetized bank
lending.
1. Mechanics: Amplification and Replication of Bank
Lending
Securitization allows a bank or other lender to remove an
asset from its balance sheet and thus be able to purchase
additional assets—and thereby extend further credit—without
incurring higher capital-regulatory obligations.107 In this
sense, it can function as what we call a bank-credit amplification mechanism: it enables banks to issue more credit ultimately accommodated and monetized by the Fed, as described
above.108
In a typical securitization, the bank establishes a “special
purpose vehicle” (“SPV”) or “special investment vehicle” (“SIV”),
usually in the legal form of a trust.109 The bank then “sells”
loans to the trust, with the proceeds of the sales becoming
available for further lending activity. To the extent that securitization enables banks to extend far more credit over time than
would otherwise be compatible with regulatory capital requirements, it functions to lever up the bank-generated creditmoney supply, as described in Part II above. We use the term
“amplification” to describe this effect.
The securitization trust purchases the assets in question
with the proceeds of bond sales to investors. These bonds are
commonly known as “asset-backed securities” (“ABS”), one
species of which is the mortgage-backed security (“MBS”). An
SPV or SIV can be internally “structured”—or “tranched”—in
order to distribute the credit risk associated with its assets in
105
See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics
of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1556 (2009);
Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1257
(2012).
106
Viral Acharya & Sabri Oncu, The Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Market, in
REGULATING WALL STREET 320 (Viral Acharya et al. eds., 2011).
107
See sources cited supra note 105.
108
See supra subpart I.B, Part II.
109
Lipson, supra note 105, at 1234.
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accordance with specific risk/reward tradeoff preferences held
by different investors.110 Tranching enables SPVs and SIVs to
issue at least some classes of bonds that are plausibly considered “risk-free” and rated as such by a credit rating agency.
Such bonds can also be further insured against loss via financial derivative transactions, as described below. Not surprisingly, in the early 2000s, certain ABS—in particular, MBS—
came to supplement Treasuries as putatively safe assets and
“transactions technology.”111
This process is depicted in Figure 11. It shows the bank
transferring its borrowers’ obligations to the SPV rather than
the central bank. Importantly, use of the SPV enables the bank
to keep lending without violating capital requirements designed
to prevent excessive bank credit-generation.112

110
In a typical structure, one class of investors (“equity tranche”) contractually agrees to be the first loss-absorber in the event of SPV or SIV losses on some
investments, in return for higher payouts on assets when they perform. Another
class of investors contracts to take the next layer of losses, in return for slightly
lower rewards, and so on. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 100, at 8–9.
111
See Gorton et al., supra note 83, at 105.
112
Note that (1) the bank continues to lend to people who invest in issuing
firms, as originally depicted in Figure 9; and (2) the SPV is itself an issuer, some of
whose bonds might be purchased by other banks or by investors who borrow from
other banks.

R
R
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FIGURE 11
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This already complex picture, however, is incomplete without a discussion of the repo market. In economic terms, a repo
is a close functional equivalent of a short-term secured loan.113
The difference between selling and repurchasing prices serves
as the (typically low) borrowing charge. The initial selling price
serves as the loan principal. The sold and then repurchased
asset—typically, U.S. Treasury or other federal Agency securities—serves as collateral.114
In late 2016, the repo markets accounted for some $3.5
trillion in transaction volume.115 They are so large, and have
grown so rapidly in recent decades, that demand for continu113

See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 100, at 9.
Repos usually require over-collateralization of the loan, with the value of
the securities exceeding the initial sale price by a specified amount, or the “haircut.” See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 100, at 3.
115
BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS., supra note 76, at 116, Table L.207 Lines 17
(total $3.67 trillion), 22 (-$20.1 billion in Fed Funds), and 25 (-$1.0 billion in Fed
Funds). We exclude Fed Funds lines to show repo volume exclusive of borrowing
in connection with interbank Federal Funds transactions.

R

114
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ous supply of potential repo collateral—far beyond the available supply of Treasuries and Agency securities—is thought to
have been a significant driver of the pre-crisis over-production
of highly-rated, but ultimately risky, ABS.116
Repo transactions do not so much amplify ordinary banking activity, like securitizations do, as functionally replicate it.
It is generally well-understood how they replicate traditional
banking activity in their maturity transformation properties:
low-cost short-term borrowings accompanied by higher-yielding longer-term investments.117 But repos also replicate bank
lending in their capacity to increase privately-extended credit
aggregates and to trigger public accommodation and monetization of the same.
In addition to being secured-loan equivalents, repo transactions augment credit aggregates economy-wide in a manner
reminiscent of that at work in the “credit-multiplication” model
of finance, discussed above.118 This occurs through the practice of rehypothecation, pursuant to which a cash lender can
re-pledge the underlying repo securities as collateral in a repo
borrowing of its own—thus initiating a chain of multiple credit
extensions using the same piece of collateral.119 The more
links in the rehypothecation chain involving the same collateral, the more credit is generated upon its basis in an inverted
pyramid style, so that an initial quantum of pre-accumulated
capital—the securities used as collateral—can be dwarfed by
the resulting investment capital.
The concatenation of multiple sequential lending transactions upon the basis of a single piece of collateral, sometimes
referred to as “churning,” lends repo transactions a “velocity”
akin to the velocity of money circulation.120 Combined with the
fact that sovereign debt makes up the lion’s share of repo collateral, this attribute of the repo market has led some econo116
See Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordonez, The Supply and Demand for Safe
Assets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 18732, Aug. 2013); Gelpern
& Gerding, supra note 83; Schinasi et al., supra note 83.
117
See Acharya & Oncu, supra note 106; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 100;
RICKS, supra note 62; Bengt Holmstrom, Understanding the Role of Debt in the
Financial System (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 479, Jan. 2015).
118
See supra section I.A.2.
119
See Tobias Adrian & Hyun S. Shin, Liquidity & Leverage, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 1 (2010); Manmohan Singh, The Velocity of Pledged Collateral (IMF, Working Paper WP/11/256, 2011); Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, The (Sizable)
Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System (IMF, Working Paper WP/
10/172, 2010).
120
Singh, supra note 119, at 16 (“Velocity of collateral” is “analogous to the
concept of the ‘velocity of money.’”). The idea of money’s circulation at a specific
“velocity” stems from IRVING FISHER, THE PURCHASING POWER OF MONEY (1911).

R
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mists to suggest that rehypothecated collateral chains and
more orthodox monetary aggregates, such as the Fed’s M2
measure,121 are effectively substitutes for one another.122
Importantly, rehypothecated collateral transactions occur
with few serious equivalents of bank reserve or capital requirements that might serve as regulatory brakes on long-term
credit extension.123 During boom times like those in the leadup to 2008, when repo haircuts drop to near-zero, existing
collateral buffers serve as the basis for effectively unlimited
growth in credit aggregates.124 This is how “the leverage cycle”
operates in repo markets.125
121
M2 includes the cash and checking deposits that constitute M1, along with
“near mon[ies]” including savings deposits, time deposits, and money market
mutual funds (“MMMFs”) as discussed below. See Definition of ‘M2,’ INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/m2.asp [https://perma.cc/NP96SRUN] (last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
122
Singh, supra note 119, at 3 (suggesting that “monetary aggregates (e.g.,
M2) can interact [with] or substitute for financial collateral that is reused”); id. at
16 (“[A] shortage of acceptable collateral would have a negative cascading impact
on lending similar to the impact on the money supply of a reduction in the
monetary base.”). If correct, this view would mean that repo rehypothecation
chains should be included in measures of the money supply. In fact, Gorton and
Metrick have suggested that they already are. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick,
Haircuts, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Nov./Dec. 2010, at 507, https://
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/10/11/Gorton.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9SF2-PHN3] (“Repos are considered part of the money supply. . . .”).
Gorton and Metrick are correct that some repos were included in the Fed’s M3
measure of the money supply, which was discontinued in March 2006; but this
was true only of repo transactions between primary dealers and the Fed. Id. at
507 n.3, 510.
123
Regulation T and SEC Rule 15c3-3 under Section 15(c) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 prohibit broker-dealers from rehypothecating more than
140% of a client’s debit balance or more than 100% of total client debits to finance
their own proprietary trading activities. But these restrictions apply only to broker-dealers, and even the latter are able to get around them in many cases by
booking transactions offshore—in the UK, for example, where rehypothecation is
not limited at all and cumulative “collateral creation” can accordingly be infinite.
Singh, supra note 119, at 4–9; Singh & Aitken, supra note 119, at 4 n.5.
124
In boom times, haircuts tend to be very low, approaching the vanishing
point, while rollovers are taken for granted as being indefinitely available. It is
easier to find both investors in the riskier equity tranches of ABS and creditderivative counterparties, or cheap “insurers.” This is how “endogenous money”
creation works: people grow more willing to spot one another credit in its many
transactional and securitized forms, which then (1) enables banks that can tap
into the associated markets to extend more ultimately Fed-accommodated loans,
and (2) ultimately increases the likelihood that the Fed will effectively ratify and
accommodate ex post even non-traditional forms of credit-extension, if systemic
financial stability itself has quietly come to depend upon their being honored.
125
See generally John Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle, 24 NBER
MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 1 (2010) (detailing the leverage cycle and its connection
to the subprime mortgage crisis), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11786 [https:/
/perma.cc/PEN9-8JQZ]. See also Adrian & Shin, supra note 119; Tobias Adrian,
Nina Boyarchenko, & Hyun Shin, On the Scale of Financial Intermediaries, Federal
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These dynamics are schematically represented in Figure
12. The smaller disc at the left represents the comparatively
small “base” of Treasury and GSE debt—securitized full faith
and credit—that supports a much larger volume of repo lending, through the practice of rehypothecation. The larger discs
to the right correspondingly represent this larger volume of
repo borrowing and lending built upon the smaller base of public debt.126
FIGURE 12
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2. From Private to Public: Fed Accommodation and
Monetization
Ultimately, however, the key to the rapid growth of the repo
market is public accommodation and monetization of private
repo liabilities. The public is an indispensable actor in the repo
market. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”) is
currently the largest counterparty in repo markets.127 Public
debt—U.S. Treasury and Agency securities—still constitutes
the principal underlying asset on which repo transactions occur.128 In effect, private repo “monetizes” trillions of dollars of
securitized public full faith and credit.
Public accommodation, in the full sense of that term, takes
the classic form of guaranteed clearing.129 Two publicly guarReserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 743, at 6–8 (Oct. 2015), http://
www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr743.pdf [https://perma.cc/36LKRNZ5].
126
Note that, to the extent banks act as cash lenders in repo markets, rehypothecation not only multiplies pre-accumulated funds, but also generates a certain amount of credit without tapping into such funds at all.
127
See Tracy Alloway & Michael MacKenzie, New York Federal Reserve Takes
on Key Role in Repo Market, FIN. TIMES (June 19, 2014), https://www.ft.com/
content/65255abc-f7cc-11e3-baf5-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/R5TNW9GK].
128
Id.; see also GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF
2007, 39–40 (2010).
129
See supra subpart I.B, on Fed bank-loan accommodation as a function of
necessary check-clearing.
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anteed banks—BNY Mellon and JPMorgan Chase—serve as
guarantor/clearing banks for the largest of the repo markets,
the tri-party repo market.130 This is especially significant in
light of the fact that Fed accommodation of bank lending, as
described above, is itself necessitated by the need to ensure
clearing of checks.131 The process is depicted in Figure 13,
which leaves clearing banks out of the picture for simplicity’s
sake but is nevertheless easily recognized as a variation on
Figures 4 and 7 above.
FIGURE 13
Central Bank

Regulatory
Compliance?

Regulatory
Compliance?
Clearing
Guarantee

Public
Debt
Treasury
& GSEs
$

Repo
Borrowers

Public
Debt &
Repurchase
Pledge

Repo
Lenders

$

The Fed’s post-crisis efforts to limit risk-taking by tri-party
repo clearing banks reflect an implicit recognition of this fundamental similarity between repo clearing and ordinary bankcheck clearing—and of the role of public accommodation in the
repo markets. The Fed has been pushing for reform in this
area with a view explicitly to the linkages between the repo
market infrastructure and “other payment clearing and settlement services that are central to U.S. financial markets” and
130
See Alloway & MacKenzie, supra note 127; BRUCE TUCKMAN, CFS POLICY
PAPER: SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE TRI-PARTY REPO CLEARING BANKS 3 (Feb. 2, 2010).
Because repo transactions are exempt, under the “qualified financial contract”
provision, from the automatic stay and claw-back provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, repo lenders are effectively guaranteed against counterparty credit
risk. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(7), 546(e), 559; 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(8)(D) (2016).
This renders repo borrowings functionally equivalent to informationally insensitive bank liabilities—i.e., deposits. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 100; GORTON, supra note 128.
131
See supra subpart I.B.
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“operated by the two tri-party agent banks” backed by the
Fed.132 Functionally, these reform measures can be analogized
to capital and other prudential regulatory requirements imposed upon banks with a view to the centrality of check-clearing to the broader economy—and the consequent need for Fed
accommodation of bank loans.133 In this context, the fact that
the Fed is stepping in to limit the risk of excessive leverage
build-up through indefinite rehypothecation of repo collateral
further strengthens the analogy between repo and traditional
bank lending.
B. Credit Derivatives Markets & Clearinghouses
Credit derivative markets constitute another important
segment of the shadow-banking sector. Derivatives are contingent claim contracts that confer payout or other rights upon
counterparties in response to changes in a contractually referenced, or “underlying,” value.134 Many of these complex financial products—including the credit default swaps (“CDSs”) and
collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”)—are used either to
construct synthetic transactions that replicate bank loans or,
by enabling lenders to hedge credit risk, increase leverage in
already transpiring lending transactions.135 Thus, derivative
transactions can both amplify bank lending (as securitization
does) and replicate bank lending without limit (as rehypothecated repo does). Amplification of bank lending necessarily
augments public accommodation and monetization, as described above. Public accommodation and monetization also
132
See FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM, http://
www.newyorkfed.org/banking/tpr_infr_reform.html [https://perma.cc/4VAHNCP5] (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). The initial focus of this reform effort was on
the need to minimize and potentially eliminate intraday extensions of credit by the
clearing banks to repo dealers and counterparties from 100% to less than 10% of
the total repo volume. See Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure, Payments
Risk Committee, Final Report (Feb. 15, 2012), https://www.newyorkfed.org/me
dialibrary/microsites/tripartyrepo/pdf/report_120215.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2HA5-YB8H]. In mid-2015, the FRBNY has reported significant progress in this
area, while noting a number of remaining hurdles on the path toward making the
triparty repo infrastructure less prone to failure. See FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
UPDATE ON TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM (June 24, 2015), http://
www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/statements/2015/0624_2015.html [https://
perma.cc/65WA-KT5C].
133
See supra Part II.
134
See generally JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (9th
ed. 2014); R. STAFFORD JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES: OPTIONS, FUTURES,
AND SWAPS 1–10 (2009).
135
See Erik Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s
Missing Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 29, 32–36, 45 n.76
(2011); GORTON, supra note 128.
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take place, however, where bank lending is functionally replicated by non-banks.
1. Mechanics: Amplification and Replication of Bank
Lending
The amplification dynamic here follows a familiar logic.
Where a bank wishes to lend more than risk-based capital
requirements permit, an alternative to securitization is to reduce asset risk by “insuring” its assets. This it can do by
purchasing derivative contracts that purport to guarantee
payouts in the event of asset defaults or value-loss. The purchased derivative in this sense simulates an insurance contract. It transfers risk, for a fee, to a party willing to bear it,
partly because that party is not constrained by regulation to
the degree that the bank is.
Derivative transactions thus serve to amplify already publicly accommodated and monetized bank lending, in a manner
similar to securitizations. This is depicted in Figure 14—a variation on Figure 11.
FIGURE 14
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Like securitizations, derivatives enable banks to keep lending without violating risk-weighted capital requirements imposed by regulators to modulate bank credit-generation.136
However, derivative transactions also can replicate, rather than
merely amplify, bank lending—now in a manner similar to repo
rehypothecation. This is readily appreciated by comparing a
credit derivative to its insurance contract counterpart. In essence, the former is a tradable and indefinitely-multipliable
variation on the latter. Free of any “insurable interest” requirement applicable to ordinary insurance policies, derivative contracts are bought and sold without limit, allowing multiple
parties to bet on the same underlying contingencies.137 The
contracts thus become financial securities that are readily
monetized, either through sale or through use as collateral in
other transactions.138
Importantly, there is no ex ante limit to these contracts’
issuance.139 Not only are they free of the insurable interest
doctrine, but there also is no reserve or capital requirement
that might restrict their proliferation via some stipulated multiplier. In this sense, these contracts—like rehypothecated repos—are cases of pure credit-generation, as modeled in section
I.A.3. Moreover, like bank loans and repo transactions, these
contracts tend to proliferate during boom times, as risk percep-

136
Note also that (1) the bank continues to lend to those who invest in issuing
firms, as originally depicted in Figure 9; and (2) the derivatives counterparty/
insurer is itself an issuer of securities that might be purchased by other banks or
by investors who borrow from other banks.
137
For more on the long-standing “insurable interest” requirement in insurance law, see Emeric Fischer, The Rule of Insurable Interest and the Principle of
Indemnity: Are They Measures of Damages in Property Insurance?, 56 IND. L. J.
445, 449–59 (1981).
138
A simple example illustrates this phenomenon. Consider a fire insurance
policy taken out on a house. Such a contract amounts to a bet entered into
between insured and insurer—a bet that the former “wins” in the event of fire, and
that the latter “wins” in the event that no fire occurs during the life of the policy.
This transaction is presumably beneficial both to the insured and the insurer, but
is in most cases of negligible significance to the broader public. That is because,
under the “insurable interest” doctrine long operative in the law of insurance,
parties may not sell the contract, and no other person may become party to it.
Now imagine a derivative contract with the same house as the “underlying” asset.
If everyone is allowed to take either side of the fire bet by purchasing or selling
tradable contracts that replicate most of the terms of the original insurance contract, the situation changes dramatically.
139
Lynn Stout, The (Re)regulation of Financial Derivatives, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 5, 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2009/06/05/the-reregulation-of-financial-derivatives/ [https://perma.cc/A8PTAVD3].
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tions diminish across the financial system.140 Derivatives can
thus function as channels of bubble-inflating over-generation
of credit-money aggregates.
These dynamics are depicted in Figure 15, which introduces an important correction to Figure 14: the discs representing bank loan volume and corresponding loan-created
deposit volume are now much larger. This expansion represents the indefinite growth in loan and consequent deposit volume enabled by the capacity for indefinitely replicated risktransfer through derivatives. If publicly accommodated, such
contracts can come to constitute an indefinitely extensible form
of securitized, and subsequently monetized, full faith and
credit of the United States—just as rehypothecation chains do
in the repo markets.
FIGURE 15
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140
See Geanakoplos, supra note 125, at 32–41; Adrian & Shin, supra note
119, at 419.
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2. From Private to Public: Fed Accommodation and
Monetization
In fact, credit derivatives are publicly accommodated—
once again, through publicly-guaranteed clearing. Prior to
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, most credit derivative
transactions traded over-the-counter (“OTC”) through large
dealer-banks.141 Under the Dodd-Frank regime, most of these
transactions are required to clear through regulator-approved
and federally-guaranteed clearinghouses, which effectively assume the risk of failure on the part of the counterparties.142
Both the dealer-banks that constituted the OTC market prior
to 2010 and the clearinghouses that have underwritten the
lion’s share of the derivatives market post-2010 have been implicitly or explicitly publicly-guaranteed—and thus widely considered to be “too-big-to-fail”—institutions.
The Fed’s guarantee of derivatives clearing is functionally
similar to its guarantee of clearing bank checks via accommodation of bank loans, as described above in Part II. As if to
underscore this point, the major derivatives clearinghouses
now have access to Fed emergency liquidity lending in the
event of crisis—a privilege previously restricted to banks.143
This structure is depicted in Figure 16, which leaves investors
in the derivatives counterparty out of the picture for simplicity’s sake.

141

See Adrian & Shin, supra note 119, at 422, 426.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title VIII, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5301 et seq. (2012)).
143
See 12 U.S.C. § 5462 (2012); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve
Comm’n, Speech at the 2011 Financial Markets Conference: Clearinghouses, Financial Stability, and Financial Reform (Apr. 4, 2011). They likewise have authority to call on their large, implicitly guaranteed member-banks for additional
capital in the event of financial distress.
142
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FIGURE 16
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Notably, the Fed (labeled as the “Central Bank” in Figure
16) now appears in two places in the diagram. It accommodates both bank lending, as discussed in Part II, and the insurance of bank loans via derivatives. Both forms of Fed
accommodation enable greater growth in credit-money aggregates. When the Fed converts both private borrower-liabilities
and private insurer-liabilities into public liabilities, it effectively
monetizes the corresponding increases in public full faith and
credit, which is then injected into the financial system.
C. Commercial Paper & Money Market Mutual Funds
A third significant component of the shadow-banking sector comprises the commercial paper (“CP”) and money market
mutual fund (“MMMF”) markets. In late 2016 there were nearly
$1 trillion in CP instruments and $ 2.7 trillion in MMMF shares
outstanding.144 For purposes of the present discussion,
144
BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS., supra note 76, at 101 Table L.121 Line 1,
115 Table L.206 Line 1., 118 Table L.209 Line 2.
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MMMFs and CPs are relevant primarily as straightforward
bank and bank-loan substitutes that mimic traditional banking sector dynamics, both in terms of credit extension and in
terms of public accommodation and monetization.
1. Mechanics: Amplification and Replication of Bank
Lending
CP is very short-term debt issued by high quality, “investment-grade” borrower-firms.145 Both of these attributes render
CP a low-risk form of lending for purchasers, and thus a lowcost form of borrowing for issuers. For that reason, the CP
market is generally considered a constituent part of the socalled “money market” for short-term debt instruments that
function as close money substitutes.146 Because CP can be
purchased on margin, the dynamics of the CP market are best
represented as in Figure 17—a variation on Figure 9 above.
FIGURE 17
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The public indirectly accommodates purchases of private
CP issuances when it accommodates bank margin loans that
fund such purchases, as discussed in Part III. In so doing, it
monetizes private debt just as it does in accommodating bank
loans made in exchange for borrower promissory notes, as discussed in Part II.
The public also accommodates CP purchases more directly, however, by providing for direct Fed “discounting” of CP
145
See Richard G. Anderson & Charles S. Gascon, The Commercial Paper
Market, the Fed, and the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis, 91 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS
REV. 589, 589, 599–600 (2009).
146
See Ricks, A Simpler Approach to Financial Reform, supra note 62, at 37.
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purchased by banks either from issuers or in secondary markets.147 Figure 18 depicts the basic mechanics of Fed discounting, leaving depositors out of the picture for the sake of
simplicity.
FIGURE 18

Central Bank

$ Discounting

CP

Issuers

$
Bank
CP

The practice of discounting CP amounts to near-direct Fed
lending to CP issuers, effected by immediately crediting the
accounts of banks that monetize CP and pass it on to the
central bank. Public credit-money generation could hardly be
more visible.
In addition, CP issuance is publicly accommodated, at
least in part, when federally-insured banks guarantee the
creditworthiness and liquidity of asset-backed CP (“ABCP”).148
Finally, the public accommodates CP issuance by guaranteeing
certain institutions that specialize in investing in, and subsequently monetizing, this form of debt—money market mutual
funds, or MMMFs.
2. From Private to Public: Fed Accommodation and
Monetization
MMMFs are open-end investment companies that specialize in forming diversified portfolios of CP and other “safe” investment securities—in particular, Treasury and Agency
147
See 12 U.S.C. § 372 (2012); FED. RES. BANK DISC. WINDOW, FEDERAL RESERVE
COLLATERAL GUIDELINES 3 (June 3, 2015).
148
See Emma-Jane Fulcher et al., The Difference Between Traditional ABCP
Conduits and SIVs, ABCP/Europe Special Report, FITCH RATINGS (2008), at 2.
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securities—on behalf of their investors.149 MMMFs also actively engage in short-term repo lending, discussed above.
With some exceptions, special accounting rules permit
MMMFs to maintain their value at precisely $1.00 per share,
while other regulatory provisions permit them to offer checkwriting capabilities to account-holders.150 This means that
MMMFs effectively monetize CP and repo on both sides of the
balance sheet: on the asset side by purchasing and lending in
the first place, and on the liability side by enabling their shareholders to write checks out of shares held in CP and repo
portfolios. Thus, at first approximation, things look as depicted in Figure 19.
FIGURE 19
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Figure 19 closely resembles Figure 1. This is because
MMMFs finance most of their activity with pre-accumulated
investor funds and are one of the few species of financial institution that conform, when considered in isolation, to the intermediated-credit model of finance discussed in section I.A.1 and
depicted in Figure 1.151
MMMFs must not be considered in isolation, however. Like
investors in any other issuer, fund investors are able to
purchase MMMF shares on margin. Hence, the relevant dy149
Money Market Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
m/money-marketfund.asp [https://perma.cc/E67X-X4MS] (last visited Jan. 30,
2017).
150
The SEC rules require prime institutional MMMFs to use floating net asset
value (“NAV”) for their shares but allow retail and government MMMFs to maintain stable NAV in the same manner as they did before the crisis. 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.2a-7 (2016); SEC, Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF,
79 Fed. Reg. 47736 (Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, et
al.).
151
Recall that the one-to-one credit-intermediation model of finance effectively
portrays all financial institutions as mutual funds. See supra subpart I.A.
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namics are more accurately depicted in Figure 20, which corrects and completes Figure 19.152
FIGURE 20
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In sum, all of the shadow-banking channels enable the
capital and money markets to amplify and replicate, in all salient respects, the functions of traditional banks. This they do
not only in their maturity-transformation properties, as focused on by regulators and academic observers concerned with
panic-proofing,153 but also in their publicly accommodated and
monetized credit-generative capacities.154
152
Not surprisingly, MMMF accounts are counted in the Fed’s M2 measure of
the money supply. See supra note 121.
153
See RICKS, supra note 62; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 100.
154
Recognizing the importance of the shadow banking sector in replicating the
traditional banking sector, the Fed recently announced its intention to use not

R
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We turn now to the key institutional mechanisms that have
enabled shadow banking’s amplification and functional replication of traditional banking. This is a different side of the
story, which highlights the role that organizational affiliations
between banks and non-bank institutions play in enabling the
expansion of the shadow banking system. Indirectly, it also
shows the role that the government, as a lax public franchisor,
has played in enabling the growth of “rogue franchisees” and
destabilizing excess credit-money generation in the first place.
V
INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION OF BANKING AND CAPITAL
MARKETS: FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES
The rise of bank-centered financial conglomerates has
been one of the key financial-industry developments of recent
decades.155 In the United States, the turning point was the
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLBA”),
which lifted longstanding legal prohibitions on affiliations between commercial banks and securities firms.156 The GLBA
allowed the creation of “financial holding companies” (“FHCs”)
that own or control commercial banks, investment banks, insurance underwriters, private equity funds, and even regular
commercial businesses.157 Post-GLBA, a few large, diversified
conglomerates came to dominate markets in complex financial
products, including ABS/MBS and derivatives, discussed
above.158
only traditional bank channels, but also shadow-banking channels in conducting
its monetary policy through open market operations. See Binyamin Appelbaum,
The Fed’s Policy Mechanics Retool for a Rise in Interest Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/business/economy/the-feds-poli
cy-mechanics-retool-for-a-rise-in-interest-rates.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
WD4Q-SPW8].
155
Xavier Freixas et al., Regulating Financial Conglomerates, 16 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 479, 480 (2007); see generally Anthony Saunders & Ingo Walter, Financial Architecture, Systemic Risk, and Universal Banking, 26 FIN. MKTS. & PORTFOLIO
MGMT. 39 (2012) (detailing both the historical rise of conglomerates and the policy
implications of this trend).
156
Financial Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). The GLBA repealed Sections 20 and 32 of the
Banking Act of 1933, popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, which established legal separation between commercial banks and investment banks.
157
See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2012).
158
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV.
963, 1002-46 (2009) [hereinafter The Dark Side]. In the wake of the recent crisis,
the financial services industry became even more concentrated. By mid-2012,
nearly all U.S. banking assets were controlled by bank holding companies, and
U.S. BHCs collectively controlled assets well in excess of $15 trillion, a five-fold
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This Part examines how these fundamental changes in the
structure of individual financial institutions affected the
broader dynamics of the financial system as a public-private
franchise. Given the complexity and opacity of financial conglomerates’ operations, it is difficult to construct a fully detailed picture of how non-bank firms benefit from their bank
affiliates’ privileged franchisee status. The sheer number of
non-bank subsidiaries of large FHCs would render this task
nearly futile.159 With these caveats in mind, this Part sketches
out some of the main channels through which conglomeration
quietly expands access to the full faith and credit resource
beyond the banking core.
A. Why Affiliate? Non-Bank Access to Bank Subsidy
So, what explains the drive toward conglomeration in the
financial sector? The standard answers to this question invoke
the two-fold benefit of diversification and intra-group synergies. Diversification is seen as an important consideration for
banks, whose permissible activities are still limited to those
included in the statutory category of the “business of banking.”160 Organizational affiliation with other firms is expected
to enhance banks’ financial soundness.161
For present purposes, however, the more interesting question is what kind of synergistic benefits securities firms and
other non-bank financial institutions gain through affiliation
with heavily-regulated commercial banks. Typical explanations stress the convenience of providing “one-stop shopping”
for institutional clients and the value of bank branches as
points of marketing and delivery of non-bank financial services
to retail clients. Affiliation with banks also creates potentially
significant economies of scale, for example, by allowing integraincrease since 1991. Dafna Avraham et al., A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 18 FRBNY ECON. POL. REV., July 2012, at 1.
159
In 2012, JPMorgan Chase & Co., an FHC that controlled four commercial
banks, reported a total of 3,391 non-bank subsidiaries. Bank of America Corporation, another FHC that controlled five commercial banks, reported 2,019 nonbank subsidiaries in its structure. Avraham et al., supra note 158, at 6.
160
See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012).
161
The proponents of this view typically point to the “source of strength”
doctrine that requires bank holding companies to commit to providing financial
support for their bank-subsidiaries in certain circumstances. For more on the
“source of strength” doctrine, see Paul L. Lee, The Source-of-Strength Doctrine:
Revered and Revisited, 129 BANKING L.J. 771 (2012). For a study of the negative
effects of diversification away from traditional banking activities, see Kevin J.
Stiroh & Adrienne Rumble, The Dark Side of Diversification: The Case of US
Financial Holding Companies, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 2131 (2006).
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tion of constituent entities’ information technology or “backoffice” processing platforms.
These familiar explanations gloss over the most fundamental reason for non-bank institutions’ affiliations with banks:
their desire to tap directly into the core of the public-private
finance franchise.162 In fact, some of the most important synergies within financial-service groups involve not merely marketing or operational cost-savings, but shared access to the full
faith and credit of the United States that is initially injected
into and flows through the banking system. A multitude of
seemingly disparate and mundane intra-group transactions,
only some of which are highlighted in this Part, form the
shadow “pipeline” for diverting that vital public resource into
shadow banking markets. It is in this sense that conglomeration provides the vital institutional infrastructure that enables
capital and money markets to amplify and functionally replicate the banks’ capacity for indefinite credit-generation, as discussed above.163
Perhaps the most critical overall benefit that non-bank financial institutions derive from affiliating with commercial
banks is access to banks’ deposit base. Because federal deposit insurance puts the U.S. government’s full faith and credit
directly behind banks’ deposit liabilities, deposits are the
cheapest and most stable source of funding for financial institutions that must borrow to invest. In the words of an industry
expert, “the fundamental economics of a diversified bank holding company with a huge insured depository at its heart is to
use those core funds for an array of activities, not just traditional lending.”164
Of course, as we show in Part II, pre-accumulated deposits
are not needed for bank lending at all. This fundamental theoretical point, however, should not obscure the fact that depos162
In this Part, we focus primarily on the channels through which various
non-bank actors in capital markets—investment banks, securities broker-dealers, investment managers, etc.—tap into the public resource administered by
commercial banks. In Europe, by contrast, one of the main forms of conglomeration involved the emergence of so-called “bank assurance” groups, which combined banks and insurance companies. See Alan D. Morrison, The Economics of
Capital Regulation in Financial Conglomerates (Oxford Fin. Res. Ctr., Working
Paper No. 2002-FE-08, Aug. 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=331040 [https://perma.cc/Q9TZ-FWXB].
163
See supra Parts III, IV.
164
Barbara A. Rehm, Coming Rules Could Wall Off Banks from Affiliates, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 3, 2013, 12:26 PM) (quoting Karen Shaw Petrou) https://
www.americanbanker.com/opinion/coming-rules-could-wall-off-banks-from-af
filiates [https://perma.cc/K7WS-U8CP].
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its can be used quite profitably for other forms of investing,
dealing, and speculative trading in financial instruments—especially by firms that are not subject to regulations imposed on
banks in virtue of banks’ “special” franchisee status. Thus,
ironically, banks’ non-bank affiliates—in particular, securities
broker-dealers—have a far greater need of deposit funding than
do banks themselves.165
Securities firms are the key players in translating the institutional integration of banking and capital markets into their
functional integration, discussed above.166 Organizational
walls render the intricate links between conglomerates’ capital
markets activities and deposit-taking largely invisible to outsiders. Nevertheless, a few key examples demonstrate how aggressively non-banks use structural affiliation with publiclysubsidized banks to tap into the core of the finance franchise in
order to expand their shadow-banking activities, as discussed
above in Part IV.
B. Derivatives Trading
The dynamics driving conglomeration are particularly visible in OTC derivatives trading, an important source of profitable business for financial institutions.167 From a securities
firm’s perspective, affiliation with a bank offers an opportunity
to combine its derivatives expertise and client book with a
bank’s balance-sheet strength––and to avoid potentially harsh
regulatory consequences.168 It is common practice within an
FHC to have broker-dealers enter into derivatives trades with
third parties and then enter into mirror-image trades with their
165
This need for cheap and abundant funding reflects a recent shift in large
U.S. securities firms’ business model toward more aggressive proprietary trading
in financial instruments. See NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER
LAW AND REGULATION § 1.02 (4th ed. 2015). Much of that trading and dealing takes
place in various shadow banking markets, and indeed creates such markets, as
described in Part IV above.
166
Given the ongoing financial innovation and product convergence, this category should be understood in functional, rather than legal-status, terms.
167
See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased
Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 332–37 (2002) (showing that OTC derivatives
trading is a major line of business for large banks).
168
The SEC’s net capital rule penalizes securities broker-dealers for holding
illiquid assets and thus makes it costlier for them to maintain large OTC derivatives trading portfolios. See SEC Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1 (2016) (detailing net capital requirements for broker-dealers). Designed to protect securities
firms’ customers and creditors from losses in the event of failure, the rule requires
registered securities broker-dealers to maintain an adequate “cushion” of liquid
assets at all times. Id. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 165, § 12.02.
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sister-banks, offloading the entire exposure onto banks’ books.
These back-to-back trades give FHCs a tremendous market
advantage: their securities subsidiaries get to grow lucrative
derivatives business without regard to otherwise crippling regulatory constraints and to transfer the risk to their publiclybacked sister-banks.169 Because banks generally have the
lowest funding costs and the highest credit ratings among the
affiliated entities––a by-product of banks’ privileged position as
first-tier outlets for distributing the full faith and credit of the
United States––this intra-group arbitrage lowers the overall
costs of derivatives dealing and trading to the FHC.170 Institutional clients prefer to have a highly-rated, federally-insured
bank with a capacious balance sheet as a counterparty to their
derivatives trades, and are willing to enter into such transactions on more generous terms than they would demand from
less creditworthy counterparties. Bank affiliation with derivatives-trading securities firms, therefore, works to increase aggregate credit-growth via the derivatives channel, as discussed
above in Part IV.
In the wake of the latest crisis, the U.S. Congress attempted to cut off this channel for shifting derivatives risk to
publicly-backed banks. Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
known as the “swaps push-out” provision, effectively prohibited federally-insured banks from trading and dealing in equity
and commodity derivatives.171 This provision sought to force
banks to “push out” these activities into a non-depository affiliate ineligible to be bailed out by the federal government in case
of failure, and to minimize “the possibility that banks would
use cheaper funding provided by deposits insured by the FDIC,

169
See STEPHEN LOFCHIE, LOFCHIE’S GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 509
(2005) (stating that, because of harsh capital treatment, SEC-registered brokerdealers less frequently act as principal than as agent for an affiliated bank, which
has the effect of simply transferring the risks of derivatives trading within the
group).
170
See Andrew P. Cross, The “Repeal” of the Swaps Push-Out Rule: A Q&A For
The Buy-Side, PERKINS COIE, DERIVATIVES & REPO REPORT (Jan. 16, 2015) http://
www.derivativesandreporeport.com/2015/01/the-repeal-of-the-swaps-pushout-rule-5-things-that-the-buy-side-should-know/ [https://perma.cc/6PJWXEJ6] (explaining how Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act impacts different buyside participants).
171
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 716, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et
seq. (2012)). This provision did not impair banks’ right to use derivatives for
hedging purposes and to continue dealing in interest rate, currency, and certain
credit derivatives. § 716(d).
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to subsidize their trading activities.”172 For our purposes, the
key point is that implementing the push-out provision, as originally enacted, would have potentially curtailed the excess amplification and replication of bank credit-creation in derivatives
markets, described above.173 Unsurprisingly, the push-out
provision became a center of intense controversy.174 In late
2014, an industry-backed amendment significantly narrowed
the “push-out” requirement to derivatives linked to certain asset-backed securities.175
This political battle over the derivatives push-out provision
serves as a powerful reminder of the critical importance to nonbank financial institutions of organizational affiliation with federally-insured banks. Access to banks’ balance sheets as the
cheapest source of funding derivatives trades, thus amplifying
and replicating credit creation in shadow banking markets,
remains a high priority for financial conglomerates.
C. Transactional Lending and Securitization
Affiliation with banks also offers non-bank financial institutions direct access to a significant internal source of transactional lending. Such access may benefit those institutions
directly, by allowing them to borrow from sister-banks, or indirectly, by enabling them to provide transactional loans to their
fee-paying clients.176 Ultimately, a steady flow of in-house
bank credit streams into the broader capital and money markets, where much of that credit is functionally replicated and
amplified, as described above.177
For broker-dealers actively trading in a wide range of financial instruments, from stocks and bonds to bespoke derivatives
and structured products, fast and reliable access to funding is
172
Robert Schmidt & Phil Mattingly, Banks Would be Forced to Push Out
Derivative Trading Under Plan, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS: SECURITIES LAW, April 19,
2010, at 9.
173
See supra subpart III.B.
174
See Cross, supra note 170.
175
See Amend. to Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2015, H.R. 83, 113th Cong. (2015), at 617 (defining “structured finance swap” as
“a swap or security-based swap based on an asset backed security”), http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-113HPRT91668/pdf/CPRT-113HPRT91668.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WX2S-Y7YS].
176
For example, the ability to tap an affiliated bank as a stand-by source of
funding for a prospective client’s leveraged buyout (“LBO”) transaction makes a
securities firm’s bid potentially more attractive in the client’s eyes and, if the bid is
successful, increases the firm’s total revenues from the transaction. The more
LBO credit is available, the more LBOs can get done, faster and easier–and the
more money ends up in the advising firm’s pockets.
177
See supra Part IV.
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crucial. Such access is also crucial for their clients typically
trading on margin, i.e. using borrowed money to finance the
trade.178 In Parts III and IV above, we discussed how the practice of margin lending effectively transforms the capital and
money markets, which orthodoxy portrays as sites of pure oneto-one intermediation, into functional extensions of the banking market operating in the pure credit-generation mode.179
For this very reason, margin trading has long been recognized
as a source of systemic risk.180 To alleviate this risk, margin
lending by securities broker-dealers is subject to extensive regulation under federal securities laws and rules promulgated by
the Fed.181 This regulation generally limits the amount of
credit broker-dealers are allowed to extend to any customer to
50% of the current market value of securities in the margin
account.182 Securities self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”)
impose additional limits and requirements on broker-dealers’
extensions of credit to their customers.183
Margin lending by banks, however, is subject to less strict
limitations under the Fed’s Regulation U.184 Plus, SRO margin
rules do not apply to banks. As a result, banks are generally
able to finance a greater proportion of securities purchases by
broker-dealers’ clients.185 Affiliation between commercial
178
The terms “margin trading” and “margin lending” generally refer to the use
of credit for purchase and ownership of securities. See POSER & FANTO, supra note
165, § 12.04[A]. Typically, securities purchased on margin serve as collateral
securing the loan extended to the account holder by the broker-dealer. Id.
179
See supra Parts III, IV. The systemic effects of margin lending are depicted
in Figures 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 20.
180
See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. By allowing greater leverage, margin trading tends to feed excessive speculation in the financial system,
thus making it more vulnerable to asset bubble-and-bust cycles. For historical
analyses of these dynamics, see generally CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT
ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (2005); JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929 (1997).
181
Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits broker-dealers from
extending, maintaining, or arranging for credit to any customer in contravention
of the Fed’s rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (2012). The Fed adopted Regulation T that
limits the amount of credit broker-dealers are allowed to extend or maintain in
their customers’ margin accounts. 12 C.F.R. Part 220 (2016).
182
See 12 C.F.R. § 220.12(a) (2016).
183
Regulation T establishes limits on “initial margin” (the amount of money
the customer is required to pay to purchase margin securities) but leaves the
regulation of “maintenance margin” (the amount of collateral value the customer
must maintain in the margin account) to securities industry SROs. See POSER &
FANTO, supra note 165, §12.04[C].
184
See 12 C.F.R. Part 221 (2016). For a detailed, if somewhat dated, discussion of the main differences between Regulation T and Regulation U requirements,
see LOFCHIE, supra note 169, at 625–29.
185
See 12 C.F.R. Part 221 (2016). Although Regulation T also governs bank
credit “arranged” by the broker-dealer, in practice, this does not present a signifi-
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banks and securities firms thus enables yet more credit to be
extended for the purpose of purchasing and speculating in corporate securities.186 Importantly, the higher volume of margin
lending also increases banks’ and broker-dealers’ inventory of
securities for use as repo collateral. As discussed above, financing margin loans through rehypothecation of collateral is
an important channel of credit replication in the shadow banking system.187
Another line of securities firms’ business that receives a
significant boost from affiliating with commercial banks is asset securitization, including mortgage securitization—again, a
significant component of the shadow banking system described
in more functional terms in Part IV.188 Before the 2008 crisis,
large-scale “private-label” securitization operations conducted
by investment banks and large FHCs spurred constantly growing demand for mortgage loan origination.189 Having an internal source of direct supply of these valuable assets gave FHCs a
built-in market advantage. Banks also provided vital funding
for FHCs’ acquisitions of loan assets from third parties.190
Not surprisingly, bank-centered financial conglomerates
played a leading role in the subprime mortgage boom that resulted in the 2008 crash, followed by the Great Recession.191 It
is also hardly surprising that, once the global financial system
nearly imploded, free-standing Wall Street investment banks
disappeared as a distinct institutional category. Organizational attachment to commercial banks, as the core private
purveyors of the full faith and credit of the United States,
turned out to be the key to financial institutions’ very survival.
To sum up, diversified bank-centered conglomerates provide the key organizational infrastructure for private expansion—and over-expansion—of the primary privilege publicly
conferred upon banks: direct access to the key public resource
cant limitation on this type of arbitrage, as long as the broker-dealer acts in “good
faith” in arranging such credit. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 165, §12.04[D].
186
For a discussion of the significance of this phenomenon in fueling
“financialization,” see infra subpart VII.A.
187
See supra subpart IV.A.
188
Id.
189
See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble,
100 GEO. L. J. 1177, 1202–10 (2012).
190
An important additional benefit of affiliation with a commercial bank was a
bank’s ability to export their home-state interest rates to borrowers nationwide,
without regard to different states’ usury laws. See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First
Omaha Serv. Corp., 438 U.S. 299 (1978). On the “exportation” doctrine, see
Elizabeth R. Shiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine
and Its Effects on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004).
191
See Wilmarth, The Dark Side, supra note 158, at 1008–15.
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that flows through the financial system.192 One of the most
insidious and potentially far-reaching, system-wide consequences of financial conglomeration is that it has opened multiple institutional channels for expanding “unauthorized”
access to, and diversion of, the monetized full faith and credit
of the United States. We do not claim to have mapped all of
these intra-group relationships and strategies. Yet, even a
brief overview of some of the most popular such strategies further confirms that the core dynamic defining modern finance is
not “one-to-one” intermediation between private suppliers and
users of scarce capital—it is continuous profitable distribution
by private franchisees of a continuously publicly-provided resource. By diverting much of that resource flow into various
“shadow” markets of the kind discussed above, financial conglomerates threaten the proper operation of this public-private
franchise arrangement.
A very different threat to this arrangement seems to be
emerging at the outer edges of the financial system, where
financial technology, or “fintech,” companies are promising to
“disrupt” and revolutionize money and credit—and to drive
both financial institutions and the state out of finance. A brief
examination of this phenomenon, however, further confirms
the correctness of the franchise view of finance.
VI
THE DISRUPTIVE FRINGE: FROM ENDOGENOUS MONEY TO
FRANCHISE EXTENSION?
In recent years, several forms of “alternative finance”—including crowdfunding, marketplace (a.k.a. “peer-to-peer,” or
“P2P”) lending, and cryptocurrency networks—have begun
“disrupting” some of the familiar patterns of financial services
delivery in the United States and globally. While inherently
192
The principal legal brake on such over-expansion is the operation of Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, designed to prevent the transfer of
federal subsidy to non-bank entities. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (2012). Section
23A imposes certain quantitative and qualitative limits on banks’ extensions of
credit to non-bank affiliates, and its companion Section 23B mandates that
banks’ transactions with affiliates be conducted on market terms. Although the
Dodd-Frank Act strengthened the Section 23A regime, it is far from clear whether
these changes will effectively protect the depository system in the future. For an
analysis of the practical operation of Section 23A regime, see generally Saule T.
Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1683 (2011) (arguing that
Section 23A is ill-suited to serve as the principal mechanism for preventing systemically harmful transfers of risks and public subsidy between depository institutions and their affiliates).
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diverse and fluid, these alternative financial markets share certain fundamental characteristics: their businesses are organized around the use of advanced technologies for processing
and sharing information; they seek to eliminate traditional financial intermediaries from financing transactions; and they
seek to avoid governmental or any other “external” control over
financial transactions.
In its aspirations to render both the banks and the central
banks redundant, this new-century fintech sector portrays itself as a revolutionary alternative to the existing financial system. Ironically, however, despite its disintermediation rhetoric,
what this currently unfolding “fintech revolution” seeks to create in practice is a pure form of the orthodox “one-to-one” intermediation model of finance, as described in section I.A.1 above,
in which traditional intermediaries such as banks or securities
broker-dealers are replaced by electronic peer-to-peer transaction platforms. Fintech enthusiasts view modern technology as
the magic key enabling the flow of pre-accumulated capital
among freely-contracting private parties, on a scale sufficiently
large to obviate the need for publicly sanctioned and supported
credit-generation.193 In that sense, fintech revolutionaries are
essentially envisioning a sort of financial “return to Eden”—or,
at least, to the putatively peer-to-peer origins of finance.194
It is too early to tell whether or not the emerging fintech
industry will succeed in its peer-to-peer “restoration” project.
However, a closer examination of the key dynamics in the alternative-finance universe suggests that, in order to expand beyond its present peripheral place, it is bound to seek
reintegration into the core finance franchise.195 Without sustained direct access to the ultimate public resource flowing
through that system—the public’s full faith and credit—alternative finance is not likely to outgrow its present fringe status.
In fact, as this Part shows, marketplace lending is already effectively re-integrated into the core financial system, if only as a
new variant of shadow banking. Cryptocurrencies may be
moving in the same direction.

193
For a sophisticated and conceptually compelling exposition of this view,
see generally JONATHAN MCMILLAN, THE END OF BANKING (2014).
194
Of course, as discussed above, financial markets are also inherently political in their genesis and operation, with sovereigns historically playing a central
role in creating and sustaining money and credit flows. See supra notes 77–81
and accompanying text.
195
Again, our discussion focuses on the U.S. fintech sector.
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A. Peer-to-Peer Finance
The earliest and most varied form of peer-to-peer finance,
crowdfunding196 denotes raising funds from a large number of
individual investors, typically by using online social networks
or specialized funding platforms.197 P2P lending is simply
crowdfunding of debt. It seeks to lower the costs of unsecured
borrowing by eliminating the need for the services of a commercial bank or any other institutional lender.198 The basic idea is
that, by using advanced technology to process information and
underwrite loans quickly and at low cost, P2P lending sites are
able to match individual lenders and borrowers efficiently and
transparently.199
Online P2P lending got its official start in late 2005.200 The
success of Prosper.com and LendingClub, both of which focused initially on consolidation of consumer debt, spurred a
rapid growth of online lending platforms specializing in various
loan products.201 The rise and proliferation of P2P financing
sites in the last decade has led some observers to declare “the
beginning of a revolution in how the general public allocates
capital.”202 Others have welcomed it as a rising tide of ultimate
196
See Craig R. Everett, Origins and Development of Credit-Based Crowdfunding (May 28, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=244
2897 [https://perma.cc/5AGQ-HMSR].
197
See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your
Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 881
(2011).
198
Lending platforms typically cap the size and maturity of individual loans
(e.g., Prosper.com extends loans ranging from $2,000 and $35,000 for a term of 3
to 5 years); limit individual investor’s exposure to a particular borrower by breaking up the loan amount among a large number of investors, and use internal and
external credit ratings to determine the risk-adjusted interest rate on each loan
(e.g., Prosper.com charges borrowers fixed interest rates between 5.99% and
36%); and collect transaction and servicing fees. See, e.g., Prosper Personal Loan
Types, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/loans/loan-types/ [https://perma.cc/
DRA3-B4NF] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
199
Unlike banks, P2P platforms typically do not make loans using their own
balance sheets: they simply find individuals willing to lend money to a particular
borrower at a particular rate. In this model, even high-risk borrowers should be
able to find potential lenders willing to take a small portion of the risk, if compensated accordingly. Banks and other balance-sheet lenders don’t have such
flexibility.
200
See Everett, supra note 196, at 6.
201
Already in 2014, marketplace lenders reportedly issued over $5.5 billion in
loans. RICHARDS KIBBE & ORBE LLP, 2015 SURVEY OF U.S. MARKETPLACE LENDING,
http://www.rkollp.com/assets/htmldocuments/RKO_LenderSurvey_FINAL2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LGN-6QDW].
202
C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
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“disintermediation”203 and emphasized substantial savings
from eliminating the costs associated with government regulation of banks and other financial institutions.204
But the P2P model has not yet been able to “crowd out” in
any significant measure the traditional markets for credit and
capital. Nor has it been able to distance and insulate itself
from the regulated, intermediary-dominated financial system
that, as we described above, runs on the ultimate public resource, the full faith and credit of the United States. In fact, a
closer look reveals a powerful trend toward a more visible integration—or re-integration—of this mode of alternative finance
into the mainstream financial system. Two factors are critical
in this dynamic: (1) the central role of deposit-taking banks as
originators of marketplace loans, and (2) the dominance of institutional investors as buyers of these loans.
The first factor is both critically important and surprisingly
under-appreciated: U.S. marketplace lending platforms have
never operated outside the core banking system. The dominant P2P lending platforms rely on insured deposit-taking
banks for three critical functions: (1) collecting deposits from
individual lenders committing to fund specific loans listed on
the platform; (2) initially funding loans by crediting each individual borrower’s bank account in the full amount of the loan;
and (3) maintaining a segregated deposit account into which
the platform operator deposits payments received from borrowers.205 Banks receive fees for performing these functions.206
After a short period of holding the loan on its own balance
sheet, the “ghost-lender” bank sells the loan to the marketplace
platform operator, which then issues to each individual lender
a note representing such individual lender’s right to receive a
proportionate share of all principal and interest payments the
platform operator receives from the borrower.207 In effect,

203
Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 445, 449 (2011).
204
Id. at 458.
205
See CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, THE REGULATION OF MARKETPLACE LENDING: A
SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES (2015 UPDATE) 2–3 (April 2015) http://doc
player.net/2792024-The-regulation-of-marketplace-lending-a-summary-of-theprincipal-issues-2015-update-april-2015.html [https://perma.cc/8RUE-FNTP].
206
Thus, LendingClub and Prosper partnered with WebBank, a Utahchartered and FDIC-insured industrial bank, which originates their consumer
loans. See, e.g., PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com/ [https://perma.cc/EYF789JT] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
207
CHAPMAN & CUTLER, supra note 205, at 2.
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things work much as they do in the case of bank offloading of
loans through securitization, as described in subpart IV.A.208
This brief description of the P2P model exposes the points
at which marketplace lenders directly tap into the publiclybacked banking system. The money ostensibly flowing “directly” back and forth between individual lenders and borrowers, in fact, flows through federally-insured banks.209 More
importantly, the loans extended by the originating banks make
deposits at borrowers’ banks, pursuant to the same mode of
credit-money generation described above in Part I.210 In this
process, the public’s full faith and credit is implicated to the
same extent as it is whenever credit is extended within the core
banking franchise, and funds are wired through the payment
network operated by the Fed.211 By attaching themselves to
banks, marketplace lending platforms gain access to banks’
significantly lower cost of funding—without becoming subject
to bank regulation.212
The second factor driving the rapid re-integration of the
P2P model into the mainstream financial system is the increasingly dominant role of institutional investors in marketplace
lending.213 In the presently prevailing low interest-rate envi208

See supra subpart IV.A.
A big part of the reason for this set-up is regulatory: U.S. marketplace
platforms cannot maintain individual lender and borrower accounts on their own
books without running a serious risk of violating legal prohibitions on unauthorized deposit-taking.
210
See supra Part I.
211
See Automated Clearinghouse Services, BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS. (May
16, 2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedach_about.htm
[https://perma.cc/P66Z-NAUA].
212
See Renaud Laplanche, Five Big Myths about Marketplace Lending, AM.
BANKER (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/five-bigmyths-about-marketplace-lending [https://perma.cc/DG6R-S2BL]. There is another important advantage marketplace lenders get by “purchasing” loans technically originated by banks. U.S. banks are exempted from getting state lending
licenses and are legally allowed to charge interest rates permissible in their home
state on loans extended to residents of any other state, without regard to such
states’ usury laws. See supra note 190. Because Utah does not cap permissible
interest loans, WebBank is allowed to extend loans nationwide without an upper
limit on the rates it charges. This ability to “rent” a bank charter to charge high
interest on consumer loans nationwide is a significant boost to marketplace lenders’ profitability—and another mechanism of tapping into the core banking
franchise. See Kevin Wack, Why LendingClub Relies on a Bank You’ve Never
Heard Of, AM. BANKER (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/
why-lending-club-relies-on-a-bank-youve-never-heard-of [https://perma.cc/
UQ2X-TYZF].
213
See Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of
Peer-to-Peer Lending and Kickstarter, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603 (2015). In the
U.K., where the trend toward institutionalization of P2P lending has not been as
pronounced, the model continues to connect primarily retail investors with indi209
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ronment, large investors searching for yield—hedge funds, private equity funds, banks, insurance companies, endowments,
and super-wealthy individuals—have become the primary buyers of marketplace loan products,214 which generally offer
higher interest rates than traditional bank loans.215 Many of
these investments are leveraged, with banks providing financing for hedge funds and other investors in marketplace
loans.216
The entry of yield-hungry institutional investors has led to
increased competition in the sector and is pushing marketplace-lending firms to grow their loan origination volumes, to
diversify their loan products, and to consolidate.217 In this
respect too, the familiar dynamic of securitization is being recapitulated in the evolution of P2P lending. Marketplace lenders
are actively forming partnerships with banks and other institutional investors, pursuant to which banks and other investors
commit to buying a certain percentage of whole loans
vidual borrowers. In part, this may be a result of a different regulatory approach
to P2P lending in the U.K. Nevertheless, some industry experts expect the rise in
the role of institutional investors in the U.K.’s P2P lending sector. See Kevin Wack
& Bailey Reutzel, How P-to-P Lending Evolved into Different Animals in U.S., U.K.,
AM. BANKER (Jun. 5, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/how-p-top-lending-evolved-into-different-animals-in-us-uk [https://perma.cc/DW8HJB7G].
214
See Kevin Wack et al., Innovation of the Year: Online Marketplace Lending,
AM. BANKER (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/innovation
-of-the-year-online-marketplace-lending [https://perma.cc/KLS5-AU54].
215
For example, LendingClub has delivered an adjusted annualized return of
nearly 8.7% on the first $8 billion of issued loans, and issued over $1 billion in
personal loans carrying interest rate above 20%. See Todd Baker, Marketplace
Lenders Are a Systemic Risk, AM. BANKER (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.american
banker.com/opinion/marketplace-lenders-are-a-systemic-risk [https://perma.
cc/EQ6H-BNQ3]. In 2014, OnDeck, a marketplace platform specializing in small
business lending, reportedly issued loans at an average annual percentage rate of
54%. See Kenneth A. Posner, Alternative Lenders Have a Ways to Go to Ensure
“Revolution,” AM. BANKER (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/
opinion/alternative-lenders-have-a-ways-to-go-to-ensure-revolution [https://
perma.cc/3DAM-5QZB].
216
See Kevin Wack et al., supra note 214 (“A handful of banks, including
Capital One Financial, have taken second-lien positions to lever funding lines to
prop up the industry. Other banks involved are also now said to include CapitalSource, Citigroup, Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank. CapitalSource is offering
lenders revolving and term note credit facilities from $5 million-$100 million,
officials there are telling potential partners.”); see also Matt Scully, Why These
Two Big Banks Are Stiff-Arming P-to-P, AM. BANKER (Oct. 24, 2014), https://
www.americanbanker.com/news/why-these-two-big-banks-are-stiff-arming-pto-p [https://perma.cc/B2JU-8UR5].
217
See Kevin Wack, Shakeout Is Coming, Marketplace Lenders Warn, AM.
BANKER (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/shakeout-iscoming-marketplace-lenders-warn [https://perma.cc/64JK-RESB].
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originated through the marketplace platform.218 To satisfy institutional investors’ demand for this lucrative asset class,
marketplace lenders are driven to intensify their “borroweracquisition” efforts, which creates incentives to extend more
high-risk loans.219 Coupled with the fact that many institutional investors leverage their investments in marketplace
loans, this is a potentially systemically destabilizing trend reminiscent of the pre-crisis dynamics of the subprime mortgage
sector.220
In sum, within a decade, marketplace lending has effectively evolved from an alternative form of peer-to-peer finance—
intended to operate in the truly “one-to-one” credit-intermediation mode described in subpart I.A—into a post-crisis rendition
of shadow-banking securitization, as described above in subpart IV.A.221 The new marketplace increasingly looks like simply another conduit for wholesale regulatory arbitrage,
whereby publicly-backed banks’ low-cost funding is used to
finance leveraged investments by non-bank institutions in potentially high-risk consumer debt.222 In the words of one lamenting observer, “Today, peer-to-peer lending is dead.”223
218
See Kevin Wack et al., supra note 214; Mike Cagney, How Marketplace
Lenders Will Save Financial Services, AM. BANKER (Aug. 19, 2015), https://
www.americanbanker.com/opinion/how-marketplace-lenders-will-save-financial-services [https://perma.cc/4JWC-44CU].
219
See Baker, supra note 215.
220
Id. These developments, of course, increase the vulnerability of marketplace lenders to cyclical changes in the institutional investor appetite for their
loans. Thus, in 2016, as investors began seeing more attractive returns in other
fixed-income markets, their diminished interest caused noticeable contraction
across the marketplace lending industry. See Kevin Wack, Lending Club Finds It
Hard to Reconcile with Banks, AM. BANKER (Aug. 9, 2016), https://
www.americanbanker.com/news/lending-club-finds-it-hard-to-reconcile-withbanks [https://perma.cc/BNH7-5EH7].
221
There is a growing trend toward securitization of marketplace loans acquired by institutional investors. The evidence of growing interest in real estate
loans as the next “hot” asset class for marketplace lending further underscores
these troubling parallels. See RICHARDS KIBBE & ORBE LLP, 2016 SURVEY OF U.S.
MARKETPLACE LENDING, http://www.rkollp.com/assets/htmldocuments/2016%20
Marketplace%20Lending%20Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK2G-D359].
222
Scully, supra note 216 (“Obtaining cheaper access to funding is a top
priority among so-called marketplace lenders, and their existence may very much
depend on how broadly they can access other and cheaper forms of capital.”); see
also Robert Barba & Tanaya Macheel, Banks Play Growing Role in Funding
Fintech, AM. BANKER (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/
banks-play-growing-role-in-funding-fintech [https://perma.cc/HVQ2-59XH]
(noting that banks are looking for “potential strategic advantages”).
223
See Investors Beware: Summers Praised Marketplace Lending, END OF BANKING , http://www.endofbanking.org/investors-beware-marketplace-lendingpraised-larry-summers/#more-631 [https://perma.cc/L98K-W3HN] (last visited
Mar. 18, 2017).
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The truth of this observation is underscored by the fact that the
industry originally known as “peer-to-peer” lending is now
called “marketplace” lending.224 The rhetoric of marketplace
lenders is also changing: instead of claiming to be a new-century alternative to obsolete banks, they now openly advocate
partnerships with traditional banks and seek co-branding of
loans with banks.225 The promise of disintermediation is turning into the reality of re-intermediation, with its more visible
and systematic pattern of tapping into the public’s full faith
and credit.
B. Cryptocurrencies
Arguably even more “disruptive” than marketplace lending,
cryptocurrencies might initially appear to threaten the very
core of the finance franchise, the centrality of the sovereign’s
full faith and credit as the foundation of money. Bitcoin is one
of the best-known and potentially influential among cryptocurrencies currently in use.226 Bitcoin is a decentralized virtual
currency that operates through a network of peer-to-peer computers, called nodes.227 It enables the use of bitcoins, electronic tokens or bits of data, as a means of payment and
exchange similar to regular currencies.228 However, unlike
224
CHAPMAN & CUTLER, supra note 205, at i. According to some estimates, by
mid-2015, only about 25% of investors in U.S. marketplace lending were individuals. See Kevin Wack, More Liquidity Seen as Key to P-to-P Retail Growth, AM.
BANKER (June 17, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/more-liquidity
-seen-as-key-to-p-to-p-retail-growth [https://perma.cc/X3JT-KWR8].
225
See Laplanche, supra note 212. According to Laplanche, the founding CEO
of LendingClub, “This arrangement plays to each party’s strengths. Lending
Club’s low operating expenses, combined with banks’ low cost of capital, reduces
the cost of credit for consumers and businesses.” Id. After Laplanche was ousted
in May of 2016 following the discovery that the company’s executives falsified
some loan data to conform it to a particular loan buyer’s specifications, however,
Lending Club lost many institutional buyers and reported an $81.4 million quarterly loss. Since then, the company’s new leadership announced its plans to
expand its retail investor base. See Kevin Wack, Lending Club Seeks to Bolster Its
Retail Investor Base, AM. BANKER (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.
com/news/lending-club-seeks-to-bolster-its-retail-investor-base [https://
perma.cc/D2AH-E6VK]. Whether or not this strategy succeeds in returning the
company back to its roots, Lending Club’s troubles serve as an apt reminder of the
fundamental tensions and fragility inherent in the marketplace lending model.
226
On the history, operation, and regulation of cryptocurrencies, see generally
NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD (2015); PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF
CRYPTOCURRENCY (2015).
227
See PEDRO FRANCO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING, AND
ECONOMICS 4, 110–11 (2015).
228
JOSE PAGLIERY, BITCOIN AND THE FUTURE OF MONEY 6 (2014). Bitcoin with a
capital “B” typically refers to the entire system supporting the virtual currency,
while “bitcoin” with a lower-case “b” denotes the actual unit of that currency. Id.
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such currencies, bitcoin is not backed by any sovereign, and its
creation and use are not controlled by any state or any single
private institution.229
At the heart of Bitcoin is an innovative blockchain technology that allows verification and recording of each transaction
within the system in a publicly-distributed ledger.230 Because
the public ledger cannot be altered, Bitcoin users need not
trust any single institution to keep the system secure—though
they must place trust in the network itself.231 Bitcoins are
stored in digital wallets but the true identities of the transacting parties are kept secret.232 Bitcoin may be either bought
with conventional money or “mined” by solving the encrypted
transactions that are continuously added to the blockchain.
The software, in effect, creates bitcoins out of thin air and
awards them to community members willing to expend their
time and effort to verify encrypted transfers between digital
wallets.233
To the extent it can serve as a store of value, bitcoin is also
a commodity that can be bought and sold for conventional
money.234 The heightened transactional privacy and security
make bitcoin an attractive means of money laundering, terrorist financing, and illegal trading in online black markets.235
The concomitant legal and regulatory risks increase the potential volatility of bitcoin and make it a less reliable store of
value.236 This has two major implications for purposes of our
discussion.
First, bitcoin’s ability to displace sovereign currency in any
significant measure (i.e., outside the Bitcoin ecosystem) re229

FRANCO, supra note 227, at 3.
Id. at 15.
231
Id. at 8–9.
232
Rainer Böhme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance, 29 J.
ECON. PERSP. 213, 220–21 (2015); FRANCO, supra note 227, at 9.
233
Mining bitcoin requires significant computing power, and the difficulty of
solving transaction “puzzles” is programmed to increase, in order to keep the
supply of bitcoin from rising too rapidly. PAGLIERY, supra note 228, at 33–34.
234
Bitcoin transactions are often accompanied by one or more conversions of
the sums into conventional currencies. Böhme et al., supra note 232, at 220.
235
See Andy Greenberg, FBI Says It’s Seized $28.5 Million in Bitcoins from
Ross Ulbricht, Alleged Owner of Silk Road, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2013, 12:50 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/10/25/fbi-says-its-seized20-million-in-bitcoins-from-ross-ulbricht-alleged-owner-of-silk-road/ [https://
perma.cc/9MRY-CKPY].
236
Bitcoin’s value has been notoriously volatile, ranging from as low as $0.75
to as high as $1,242, between 2011 and 2014. Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV.
271, 292–93 (2015).
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mains quite limited. Financial institutions subject to extensive
anti-money laundering laws and regulations have to factor-in
the elevated risk of transacting in cryptocurrency, which directly affects the rate of bitcoin acceptance in commercial
transactions. Furthermore, the majority of the population are
not likely to keep their long-term assets in cryptocurrency that
is not backed by the central bank—and can at any moment be
declared illegal by the government. Accordingly, the value of
cryptocurrencies is tied fundamentally to their convertibility
into conventional currencies, such as U.S. dollars backed by
the full faith and credit of the United States.237 Cryptocurrencies are therefore likely to remain on the fringes of the financial system.238 Not surprisingly, startup cryptocurrency firms
have reportedly been looking for partnerships with banks that
have the resources and scale to reach mainstream
audiences.239
The second implication is that bitcoin’s high volatility as a
store of value makes it an attractive underlying commodity for
derivatives trading. In September 2014, TeraExchange established the first regulator-approved U.S. bitcoin derivatives
trading platform.240 It may be only a matter of time before large
U.S. FHCs enter this market and turn virtual currencies into
the raw material for derivatives trading. The emergence of a
deep market for hedging—and speculating on—bitcoin risk
would, in turn, enable growth in the bitcoin acceptance rate in
commercial transactions. Thus, as in the case of marketplace
lending, the most likely mechanism for the success of
cryptocurrency, ironically, involves its integration into the ex237
See Kevin Wack, Handle with Care: Startups Blend Bitcoin with P-to-P Lending, AM. BANKER (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/handle-with-care-startups-blend-bitcoin-with-p-to-p-lending [https://perma.cc/
TN3A-ND6H].
238
Blockchain technology, however, may potentially revolutionize payments,
securities settlements, title recording, and other back-office systems used by
financial institutions. See Nasreen Quibria, Blockchain’s Cross-Border Promise,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 10, 2015, at 8; Edward Robinson & Matthew Leising, Blythe
Masters Tells Banks the Blockchain Changes Everything, BLOOMBERG MARKETS
(Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-09-01/
blythe-masters-tells-banks-the-blockchain-changes-everything [https://
perma.cc/F7LD-5SRF].
239
See Wack, supra note 237; Sarah Todd, Banks’ Real Fight with Fintech:
Who Owns the Customer?, AM. BANKER (Jun. 19, 2015), https://
www.americanbanker.com/news/banks-i-real-i-fight-with-fintech-who-ownsthe-customer [https://perma.cc/ZA9S-BPTZ].
240
See Michael J. Casey, TeraExchange Unveils First U.S.-Regulated Bitcoin
Swaps Exchange, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
teraexchange-launches-bitcoin-derivatives-exchange-1410543989 [https://
perma.cc/A39K-GPUU].

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN501.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 69

26-JUL-17

THE FINANCE FRANCHISE

10:09

1211

isting financial architecture—again, through the familiar channels of shadow banking, described above.241
In sum, the current dynamics of alternative finance, including cryptocurrencies and marketplace lending, confirm the
basic intuition behind the franchise view of the financial system. While a full discussion of the complex and dynamic
fintech universe is beyond the scope of this Article, the key
point for our purposes is simple: to move beyond its current
fringe position, the fintech industry has to be more explicitly
and directly integrated into the core finance franchise.242 It
appears that access to the flow of the ultimate financial resource, the full faith and credit of the sovereign, remains the
key driver of finance even in its 21st-century form.
VII
FROM THE FINANCIAL TO THE “REAL”: FINANCIALIZATION
AND ITS CURE
Our main thrust so far has been to map a new vision of the
architecture and dynamics of the financial system, from its
inner banking core to its fintech fringe. As our mapping exercise reaches the outer edges of the financial universe, a natural
question arises: Now what?
What lies beyond the boundaries of the financial sector is
the “real” economy, populated by those enterprising firms and
thrifty households whose needs a financial system purportedly
serves. The orthodox intermediation myth has little to say
about how that “service” link works. It is simply assumed that
efficient “one-to-one” financial intermediation naturally results
in the right quantities of capital flowing to the right economic
actors. In recent decades, however, this assumption has grown
untenable in light of the so-called “financialization” of most
developed economies. In this Part, we indicate how a shift from
241

See supra Part IV.
In one of the most vivid illustrations of this integration dynamic, several of
the world’s largest banks—including UBS, Deutsche Bank, Santander, and BNY
Mellon—are reportedly developing a new form of digital cash for use in the clearing and settlement of financial transactions via blockchain. Not surprisingly, this
venture’s success depends fundamentally on banks securing the relevant central
banks’ agreement to ensure direct convertibility of their proprietary coin units
into sovereign currencies. See Martin Arnold, Big Banks Plan to Coin New Digital
Currency, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/1a962c166952-11e6-ae5b-a7cc5dd5a28c [https://perma.cc/Z76Z-XBKK]. Moreover, central banks themselves are beginning to explore the possibility of issuing their own
digital currency using distributed ledgers. See John Barrdear & Michael Kumhof,
The Macroeconomics of Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies 3–4 (Bank of England, Staff Working Paper No. 605, July 2016).
242
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the intermediation myth to our franchise theory of finance enables a fuller understanding of what drives financialization—
and how to cure it within the parameters of our current institutional arrangements.243
A. The Cause: Franchisor Absenteeism
Despite its salience in contemporary political and academic debates, the term “financialization” lacks precise definition. It encompasses a variety of phenomena ranging from the
growing share of GDP attributable to the financial sector, to the
massive entry of financial speculators into commodity futures
markets,244 to non-financial companies’ increasing reliance on
income from financial investments,245 to a prioritization of
“shareholder value” over production-related goals in corporate
governance.246
In the academic literature, financialization has been
broadly defined as the “increasing role of financial motives,
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in
the operation of the domestic and international economies.”247
Scholars have examined a wide variety of economic, political,
ideological, and other factors thought to explain the march of
financialization in recent decades: theoretical advances in finance, structural shifts in the distribution of economic and
political power in advanced economies, the influence of neoliberal ideology on states’ policy choices, the ascendance of
shareholder supremacy in corporate law and governance, and
so on.248
243

See infra note 254.
See Ing-Haw Cheng & Wei Xiong, The Financialization of Commodity Markets 4–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 19642, Oct. 2013), http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2350243 [https://perma.cc/
6LAX-GPR8].
245
See Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Financialization and U.S.
Income Inequality, 1970–2008, 118 AM. J. SOC. 1284 (2013).
246
Natascha van der Zwan, Making Sense of Financialization, 12 SOCIO-ECON.
REV. 99, 107–10 (2014), http://ser.oxfordjournals.org/content/12/1/99.full.pdf
+html [https://perma.cc/4QSM-DEHH].
247
GERALD A. EPSTEIN, FINANCIALIZATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 3 (2005); see
also Thomas I. Palley, Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters 3 (The Levy
Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 525, Dec. 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1077923 [https://perma.cc/Y72K-3435] (arguing that
financialization elevates the significance of the financial sector relative to the real
sector and transfers income from the latter to the former); Gerald F. Davis &
Suntae Kim, Financialization of the Economy 41 ANN. REV. SOC. 203, 204 (2015),
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/gfdavis/Papers/Davis_Kim_financialization_re
vised.pdf [https://perma.cc/BYC8-VHSB].
248
GRETA R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS 27–28 (2011).
244
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While all of these analyses provide invaluable insights into
various aspects of financialization, they nevertheless fall short
of articulating a conceptually unified account of its root causes
and core dynamics. Reconceiving the financial system as a
public-private franchise for the propagation and allocation of
the full faith and credit of the United States provides a useful
analytical framework for developing such an account.
The fundamental purpose of the franchise arrangement,
whereby the state cedes management of the flow of its key
resource to private rent-earning financial institutions, is to
supply the macro economy with sufficient credit to support
productive enterprise. There are two key elements of this task:
(1) maintaining appropriate aggregates of credit, and (2) allocating that credit—in each case, to ensure full utilization of the
economy’s productive capacity.
As a matter of institutional design, the first task—that of
modulating the credit supply—is officially reserved to the
franchisor, acting primarily through the central bank or monetary authority that conducts its monetary policy.249 This is so
because the determination and generation of optimal credit
aggregates is best performed by a public actor with a view of the
entire economy and an ability to exercise judgment on behalf of
the entire polity. The second task—that of allocating credit—is
generally delegated to private franchisees, including banks and
other financial institutions.250 The principal justification given
for this delegation of control over the allocation of financial
resources to private actors is their putatively superior ability to
gather and process vital market information at the micro level
faster and more efficiently than any one agent such as the state
is able to do.
From this perspective, “financialization” can be defined as
a dysfunctional mode of interaction between the financial system and the real (i.e., non-financial) economy, in which a disproportionate share of the flow of the monetized full faith and
credit of the sovereign is continuously re-absorbed by the for249
For more on the modulation task, see Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for
Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010). For more on the allocation task, see
Robert Hockett & Saule Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a
Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 201 (2015).
250
The government often influences credit allocation decisions made by private financial institutions, e.g., through various regulatory and tax policies that
encourage or discourage particular behaviors by private actors. However, this
does not alter the principle embodied in the system, whereby privately-owned
financial institutions control who gets access to credit, and under what conditions. However important in any particular context, regulation is only an overlay.
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mer rather than flowing to the latter. In this mode, simply
pumping more financial fuel into the system does not ease
chronic capital shortages in the non-financial sector—it merely
exacerbates capital “glut” in financial markets, further reinforcing the underlying dysfunction. Thus, at its most fundamental, systemic level, financialization is a manifestation of the
failure of the finance franchise arrangement to deliver its intended result: effective modulation and allocation of credit that
ensures full utilization of the economy’s productive capacity.
The underlying cause of this failure is continuing public
accommodation of private credit-generation, as described
above, without effective public “quality control” over franchisees’ performance of their delegated responsibilities. More specifically, financialization of the economy happens when (1) the
central bank or monetary authority, as arm of the franchisor, is
unable or unwilling to modulate credit aggregates in a manner
that prevents excess private credit-generation; and (2) private
financial institutions, as franchisees, misallocate credit by diverting it to uses other than investment in productive
enterprise.
These two dynamics are intimately interconnected, in that
fad speculative investment by franchisee-institutions in particular sectors of the economy such as housing (i.e., misallocation), unchecked (i.e., unmodulated) by an active franchisor,
continues to the point of becoming an unsustainable bubble
(over-allocation). Both accordingly reflect a situation in which
the franchisor, intentionally or unintentionally, has taken a
sub-optimally passive role in the partnership. Thus, for example, by allowing unrestrained amplification and replication of
bank lending activity in the shadow banking sector as discussed above, the Fed effectively ceded too much of its power to
generate, and thus determine the aggregate amount of, credit
to private financial institutions.251 Before the crisis of 2008
exposed the depth of the problem, the Fed’s failure to restrict
the accumulation of hidden leverage in the financial system, or
even to track such accumulation, rendered its traditional monetary policy largely ineffective as a tool for modulating credit
aggregates.252
At the same time, private franchisees—banks and other
financial institutions—failed to live up to the Hayekian ideal of
informational efficiency in allocating capital to its most productive uses. As private actors driven primarily by profit-making
251
252

See supra Part IV.
Id.
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motives and the need to satisfy increasingly short-term market
expectations, these financial institutions are inherently ineffective as macro-level economic decision-makers.253 The logic of
financialization reflects the basic fact that these financial institutions find it more profitable to channel credit toward markets
in financial instruments, in which they have significant informational and institutional advantages, than toward real-economy projects with long-term payoffs that depend on a variety of
macroeconomic factors these financial institutions cannot
control.
B. The Cure: Franchisor Leadership
This approach to defining and explaining financialization
lends itself to a simple but powerful solution.254 In order to
restore the proper mode of interaction between finance and real
economic enterprise, the currently absentee-franchisor must
reassert its leadership with respect to both (1) the generation
and modulation of credit; and (2) the allocation of that credit to
productive activities. In other words, the franchisor must
proactively counteract and minimize the closely related evils of
over-extension and misallocation of credit by private profitdriven franchisees.
Post-crisis reforms and current proposals to strengthen
macroprudential regulation, and thus limit leverage build-ups,
aim explicitly at the modulation task.255 Despite their significance, however, these post-crisis regulatory reform efforts continue to reflect the pervasive influence of the intermediation
myth. Even in today’s more systemically-conscious regulatory
environment, private market actors, seen as the sole source of
intermediated scarce capital, retain ultimate control over decisions that directly affect credit aggregates, a matter of urgent
253

See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 249.
As discussed above, we leave to one side for present purposes the question
of whether our current institutional arrangements might ultimately require
wholesale reconstruction or replacement. Our “best lights” interpretation of present arrangements is meant to guide policy in maximizing their publicly beneficial
potential. See supra note 17. Accordingly, the following discussion assumes that
we continue to operate within the currently existing, hybrid public-private system
of finance, rather than seek to replace it with something fundamentally different.
For an instructive and provocative example of wholesale rejection, on more libertarian grounds, of current institutional arrangements, see MCMILLAN, supra note
193.
255
See Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, Macroprudential Policy: A Literature Review (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 337, Feb. 2011); IMF,
Macroprudential Policy: An Organizing Framework (Mar. 2011); Robert Hockett,
The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and Soundness’ to Systemic
‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2015).
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public concern. The reigning narrative of finance thus forecloses any meaningful means of preventing leverage-driven asset price bubbles and busts other than through indirect
shaping of private actors’ incentives and behavior.256 Debunking the intermediation myth, by contrast, broadens
policymakers’ field of vision to include measures directly
targeting the mechanisms of amplification, replication, and
public accommodation of private money and credit creation in
the shadow banking sector as discussed above.257
This attitudinal shift has far-reaching policy implications.
For example, it opens space on the reform agenda for
mandatory pre-approval of complex financial products—a regime under which financial institutions would bear the burden
of proof that a particular derivative or other financial product
would not amplify or replicate bank credit-creation in a manner
likely to lead to a destabilizing over-generation of publicly accommodated private credit.258 The franchise view also provides a more comprehensive analytical and normative
justification for thoroughgoing structural reform in the financial sector—reform that would impose institutional limitations
not only on bank risk-taking but also, more fundamentally, on
excessive functional replication and amplification of bank lending outside that core franchise.259 It also bolsters support for
imposition of significantly higher minimum capital requirements than those currently applicable to banks and other systemically important financial institutions.260 Freedom from
the intermediation orthodoxy enables policymakers to see the
potential of these and other currently off-the-table regulatory
measures for curing the perennial problem of credit
oversupply.
The finance franchise theory also offers a helpful framing
device for addressing the broader problem of ensuring the flow
of credit to productive uses in the real economy. It provides a
theoretical foundation for significantly expanding, even fundamentally reimagining, the role of the public as a direct participant in, rather than a mere outside regulator of, financial
256
Currently operative capital adequacy rules, securitization “skin-in-thegame” requirements, and mandatory central clearing of derivatives are examples
of such incentive-shaping reforms.
257
See supra Parts IV–V.
258
For a discussion of such a regime, see Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal:
Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63 (2012).
259
See supra Part V.
260
See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 54 (arguing for significantly increased
bank capital requirements).
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markets. It is in this capacity as an endogenous market actor
that the public franchisor can—and should—exercise greater
and more direct influence on economy-wide credit allocation.
Public instrumentalities already actively participate in financial markets in a variety of roles: they buy, sell, lend, borrow, insure, and securitize financial assets. They differ from
private market participants in two critical respects: (1) they are
typically very large actors with significant funding advantages,
directly channeling and/or fully backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States; and (2) their actions are not
driven—or, therefore, constrained—by profit-making considerations. They have longer time horizons and are uniquely situated to act as indispensable market contrarians in taking
privately unpalatable risks with a view to generating systemic
public benefits.261
The finance franchise framework advocated here enables
us to build upon that insight. We can envision, for example, a
national development bank, organized as a public-private partnership in which the public takes the lead investment-management role.262 This new hybrid entity would direct the flow of
private and public money into projects that enhance the real
economy’s potential for sustainable growth, thus jumpstarting
the development and spread of potentially transformative new
infrastructures and industries. Such an institution would not
only have obvious allocative significance, but would also assist
with the credit-modulation task by issuing a new safe asset
class tied to productive investment and thereby draining excess credit from more purely speculative instruments.263
We do not aim here to elaborate these proposals. This
Article—part of our broader project of rethinking finance—is
meant to articulate the analytic and normative foundation of
our more programmatic proposals advanced in companion
pieces.264 By reversing the defining presumptions underlying
the dominant paradigm of finance, our theory of “franchise
261

See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 249 at 116.
Id. at 150–159.
263
Id.
264
See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices,
2 J. FIN. REG.1 (2016); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial,
or Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation—and Vice
Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 453 (2016); Hockett & Omarova, supra note 249;
Saule T. Omarova, Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The “Golden Share”
Approach, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1029 (2017); Robert Hockett, Are Bank Fiduciaries
Special?, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1071 (2017); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova,
Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority, 43 J.
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017).

R

262

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN501.txt

1218

unknown

Seq: 76

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

26-JUL-17

10:09

[Vol. 102:1143

finance” exposes the irrelevance of most orthodox arguments
against public “interference” in “private” financial markets. It
brings to light new possibilities for using financial markets as a
legitimate—indeed, crucial—arena in which public instrumentalities actively pursue a broad range of investing, trading, and
other transactional strategies to ensure that credit flows in
appropriate quantities to its most productive “real” uses. Only
by fully vetting these possibilities can we hope to secure our
long-term financial stability and economic prosperity.
CONCLUSION
We began this Article by arguing that the dominant view of
finance as intermediated scarce private capital is a profoundly
misleading picture of the primary dynamic of a modern financial system. We outlined an alternative, more up-to-date vision
of finance, in which the central role is played by the public that
continuously distributes its full faith and credit in monetized
form throughout the entire system. From this perspective, the
financial system operates essentially as a franchise arrangement in which the public is the franchisor, while the private
institutions that dispense its full faith and credit are effectively
its franchisees.
An overarching implication of this change in the basic narrative of finance—from the intermediation myth to the
franchise view—is a fundamental analytical and attitudinal
shift with respect to the proper balance between public and
private interests, capabilities, and roles in finance and the
broader economy. Reconfiguring our basic understanding of
the financial system in this way is a necessary first step toward
making finance work in a manner that aids, rather than hinders, inclusive and stable economic development. It underwrites explicit recognition that the public must take an active
role in modulating and allocating credit aggregates across the
economy. It also offers a bolder, more creative approach to
designing new means of doing so.
Such new means are not merely desirable: they are necessary if we are to preserve and improve our present hybrid system of finance, in which the sovereign public engages the
services of private actors in the critically important process of
distributing its full faith and credit. The only other alternative
would be to sever this public-private partnership and replace
existing institutional arrangements with something entirely
different. That, however, is a subject for another day.

